But Can They Fight?

Russia's Massing Troops And Not Using Them?

As a rule, I do not comment much on the war in Ukraine these days. There simply is no good way to separate the fact from the fiction, with both sides pushing their own flavor of propaganda to the exclusion of all else

However, there has been a lot of media traffic of late about whether or not Russia can still field an effective fighting force—to wit:

A top British defense official said Tuesday that Russia's combat abilities have been slashed in half since last year's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In comments before a parliamentary hearing, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin — the formal head of the United Kingdom's armed forces and chief military adviser to Prime Minister Rishi Sunak — claimed that Russia is now "so weak" it could no longer wage a military counter-offensive of its own.

If Admiral Radakin has it right, Russia can only sit in the trenches and wait for Ukraine to attack.

The key word here being “if”.

Radakin grounds his assessment of Russia’s combat capacity in terms of the materiel that has been lost since Russia invaded Ukraine February 24, 2022.

"Russia has lost nearly half the combat effectiveness of its army," Radakin said, according to the Financial Times. "Last year it fired 10 million artillery shells but at best can produce 1 million shells a year. It has lost 2,500 tanks and at best can produce 200 [new] tanks a year."

Certainly Russia has experienced significant equipment losses during the war in Ukraine, based on tallies compiled by open source intelligence site Oryx. The Oryx tallies appear to be supported by the amount of older equipment being deployed by Russia in Ukraine (also according to tallies assembled by Oryx.).

But does older equipment automatically translate into radically diminished combat effectiveness?

It might if that older equipment doesn’t have many experienced troops to man it. US intelligence documents leaked in April estimate that Russia’s casualty rates are considerably higher than Ukraine’s, with twice as many Russian soldiers getting killed than Ukrainian soldiers.

Leaked US intelligence documents reveal that more than twice as many Russian soldiers as Ukrainian soldiers have been killed while fighting in Ukraine.  

The documents, which were recently leaked on social media and are currently the focus of a federal investigation, offer estimates for Russian and Ukrainian casualties. US officials have described the information included in the leak — which appear to provide detailed assessments on the Ukraine war — as highly sensitive and classified.  

One document in particular suggests that Russia has suffered between 189,500 and 223,000 casualties, including between 35,500 and 43,000 soldiers killed in action and between 154,000 and 180,000 troops wounded.

Ukraine, by contrast, has suffered between 124,500 and 131,000 casualties, including between 15,500 and 17,500 soldiers killed in action and between 109,000 and 113,500 troops wounded. 

Other casualty estimates appear higher.

Britain's defense ministry said in a February intelligence update that between 40,000 and 60,000 Russian-linked forces — which includes Moscow's regular military and mercenaries from the Wagner Group paramilitary organization — have likely been killed. The Center for Strategic & International Studies, meanwhile, assessed that same month that between 60,000 and 70,000 Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine. 

If these estimates are at all accurate, then Russia has suffered significant losses since invading Ukraine, losses which can only work against its capacity to carry out combat operations.

We must consider this possibility as it is being reported in Russian media that Putin is raising the age limits for mobilizing reservists, while increasing the age limit for reservists—effectively increasing the potential pool of reserves within the population should Putin seek to raise fresh formations.

Amendments were made to the law "On military duty and military service", they will enter into force on January 1, 2024. We are talking about soldiers, sailors, sergeants, foremen, ensigns or midshipmen. For those of them who belong to the first category, the age limit increases from 35 to 40 years, for the second - from 45 to 50 years, for the third - from 50 to 55 years.

The age limit for being in the mobilization reserve of citizens in the reserve is also increasing. For senior officers, it will be 65 years, for junior officers - 60 years, for those with other ranks - 55 years. The age limit for being in the mobilization reserve for senior reserve officers remains at the level of 70 years.

If nothing else, such moves by Putin indicate Russia is looking to tap a deeper reservoir of manpower for the war in Ukraine—not a positive sign for Russia in this war. Expanding the reservist pool suggests Russia is somewhat stressed in terms of military manpower.

Another point seemingly in favor of a negative assessment of Russia’s military capacities: Ukraine has carried out yet another drone strike on Moscow. While it appears no vital military targets were hit, there is no denying the reality that Russia’s air defenses failed to stop the drones before they reached Moscow. Ukraine succeeded in flying the drones literally halfway across European Russia essentially unopposed.

If Russia cannot stop Ukrainian drones how long before Ukraine targets more consequential facilities, such as Russia’s oil pipeline network and oil refineries?

Russian Pipelines, Meet Ukrainian Drones

We should not forget that Russia’s pipeline nexus near the Samara refinery is roughly 630 miles from Kharkiv, while Moscow is just under 400 miles.

Russia’s seeming inability to neutralize Ukrainian drones closer to the border means a number of significant Russian economic targets are potentially within the range of Ukraine’s drones. At a minimum it suggests Russia has to spread her air defense resources around to secure more potential targets.

However, this negative assessment of Russia’s combat capabilities contrasts with reports from Ukraine that Russia has massed over 100,000 troops, plus tanks, in the Russian-held territories near the northern city of Kharkiv, liberated from Russia by Ukraine during their surprisingly successful fall offensive.

Russia is building a force of 100,000 soldiers to attack the northern sector of the frontline as Ukrainian commanders start to admit that their counter-offensive has stalled.

Col Serhi Cherevaty, a Ukrainian army spokesman, said that Russia had also ordered Storm-Z ex-convict battalions to prepare for battle and was firing more than 500 shells per day at Ukrainian forces around Kupyansk.

“The enemy has concentrated a very powerful group,” he said. “More than 100,000 personnel, more than 900 tanks, more than 550 artillery systems and 370 rocket salvo systems.”

Ukraine’s assessment is that the Russia massed these forces in relation to a drive towards Kupyansk and possibly Kharkiv beyond.

This estimate is echoed by the Institute for the Study of War in its July 18, 20232 Ukraine update.

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and made tactical gains in this area on July 18. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 2km along the front and up to 1.5km in depth in an unspecified area in the Kupyansk direction.[27] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including “Storm-Z” assault detachments, took control of the remainder of Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces from the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) advanced 3km west of Lyman Pershyi (11km northwest of Kupyansk) in the Kupyansk direction, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked west of Lyman Pershyi.[29] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks and gained territory in Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Kuzemivka (16km northwest of Svatove), and Karmazynivka (12km southwest of Svatove).[30] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including convict-formed “Storm-Z” detachments, captured Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove).[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are transferring reserves to the area to counterattack and defend against Russian advances.[32] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Russia has concentrated over 100,000 personnel along the entire Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border.[33]

I note, however, that when I de-mangle the link provided in footnote 33, the Ukraine-language website that resolves makes no mention of 100,000 troops. Colonel Cheravaty speaks only of combat engagements and casualty figures.

If we talk about the Lymano-Kupian direction, here the enemy is trying to seize the initiative. The defense forces contain his attacks. This direction is the leader in terms of artillery strikes. 536 times the enemy hit here with different types and calibers of artillery. During the day, there were 8 combat clashes and 10 air raids. Also, 34 occupiers were destroyed, 115 were wounded, an enemy T-72 tank, BMP and Pion self-propelled guns were knocked out, - said the spokesman of the Eastern Group of Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

So the ISW reflects the corporate media reporting, but the sourcing for that figure is questionable. However, the 100,000 troop estimate is what is being circulated through corporate media.

How can Russia have lost half or more of its combat effectiveness, be unable to mount counteroffensive operations, and still be able to mass 100,000 troops plus 900 tanks along the northern part of the front?

A country which can amass 100,000 troops at a concentrated point surely has some combat capacity.

At the same time, if Russia has massed 100,000 troops near Kupyansk, why aren’t they attacking more vigorously? Why aren’t there larger territorial gains being made?

Looking at the summaries provided by the ISW, there are reports of limited offensive operations near Kupyansk, but nothing that would indicate the deployment of 100,000 troops. From the July 20, 2023 Ukraine update:

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and advanced as of July 20. Geolocated footage published on July 20 shows that Russian forces advanced across the N26 Kupyansk-Svatove highway south of Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove).[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces made marginal advances in the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna).[56] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks southwest of Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk).[57] Ukrainian National Guard Main Directorate’s Application Planning Department Deputy Director Colonel Mykola Urshalovych acknowledged that Russian forces recently attempted a limited offensive effort on the Kupyansk-Lyman line but said that Ukrainian forces repelled the Russian assaults.[58]

When scanning Russian media while working on this article I have found no mention of fresh offensives in the northern part of the front: nothing on TASS, nothing on RIA Novosti, and nothing on Kommersant. While operational secrecy would preclude offensives being discussed in advance, once troops were engaged and on the attack at least some of that need for secrecy has lapsed, and still nothing.

So while there appears to be a minor push towards Kupyansk, Russia is not conducting any offensive that would amount to 100,000 soldiers in the north—or anywhere else along the front lines.

Why not?

It is perhaps illuminating to recognize also that there is a report circulating within the media speculating that one reason Wagner Group is now in Belarus is to prepare for an attack on Poland’s Suwalki Gap, in order to connect Russia proper with the Kaliningrad exclave along the Baltic Sea.

However, [Andrey] Kartapolov said during a recent appearance on Russia-1's Evening with Vladimir Solovyov that Wagner forces may be preparing for a new attack against Poland, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Kartapolov's claims could not be independently confirmed by Newsweek, and neither Putin nor Wagner leadership have signaled that there are imminent plans to invade Poland.

Kartapolov said Wagner troops were sent to "train" Belarusian soldiers in preparation for a potential attack against Poland to potentially seize control of the Suwałki Gap, a small but strategically important strip of Polish territory between Russia and the exclave of Kaliningrad that has long been a sticking point for Russia. His remarks come after Poland moved troops last week to its Eastern border due to Wagner concerns.

Such an attack would be quite the escalation by Russia, and would almost certainly trigger a direct conflict between Russia and NATO. While Russia has eyed Poland’s borders previously (in February Dimitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, openly speculated that Poland’s borders needed to be redrawn), to date there have been no deployments of troops openly reported that would indicate Russia plans to expand its war to Poland and NATO in the immediate future. Medvedev’s earlier remarks hardly constitute a solid confirmation that Kartapolov’s comments are an accurate assessment of Russia war policy.

Still, reports of Wagner mercenaries at least wanting to attack Poland continue to circulate, with some of the comments being attributed to Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko.

“The Wagner guys have started to stress us. They want to go west. ‘Let’s go on a trip to Warsaw and Rzeszow,’” Lukashenko said during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg, according to the Polish Press Agency.

According to the Polish media, Lukashenko’s comments came during a meeting with Putin where he also intimated Poland was planning an attack on Belarus:

For a conversation with the President of Russia, Aleksandr Lukashenko brought a map of the redeployment of Polish troops near the border with Belarus. Emphasizing that one of the Polish brigades is 40 kilometers from Brest, and the other about 100 kilometers from Grodno, he argued that this was a plan of Polish aggression against his country.

If this narrative is to be believed, Russia has significant combat capabilities remaining and may be preparing to use them…somewhere.

A divergence between a particular narrative and the reality on the ground is not a new feature of the reporting on the war in Ukraine, nor is this the first time there have been reports of massed Russian formations preparing to launch a fresh offensive in Ukraine. In February, there were reports that Russia was gathering as many as 300,000 troops and 2,000 tanks for a fresh offensive in the Donbass region.

Russia has prepared almost 2,000 tanks and 300,000 soldiers for a renewed offensive to seize Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region in the coming weeks, a Ukrainian intelligence officer has warned.

The attack is expected to be bolstered by thousands more armoured vehicles, artillery systems, as well as hundreds of fighter jets and helicopters.

For weeks, Ukrainian officials have warned of a pending Russian offensive in a bid by the Kremlin to regain the initiative after months of stalemate on the battlefield.

However, beyond the taking of Bahkmut, Russia has had only sporadic and incremental gains along the front line with Ukraine.

Even so, on February 8, the ISW did report that Russia had “regained the initiative” with renewed assaults in the area of Kupyansk.

Russian forces have regained the initiative in Ukraine and have begun their next major offensive in Luhansk Oblast. The pace of Russian operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line in western Luhansk Oblast has increased markedly over the past week, and Russian sources are widely reporting that conventional Russian troops are attacking Ukrainian defensive lines and making marginal advances along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border, particularly northwest of Svatove near Kupyansk and west of Kreminna.[1] Geolocated combat footage has confirmed Russian gains in the Dvorichne area northwest of Svatove.[2] Russian military command additionally appears to have fully committed elements of several conventional divisions to decisive offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line, as ISW previously reported.[3] Elements of several regiments of the 144^th and 3^rd Motor Rifle Division (20^th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) and a regiment of the 90^th Tank Division (Central Military District), supported by elements of the 76^th Airborne Division and unspecified Southern Military District elements, are conducting offensive operations along the entire Svatove-Kreminna line and are reportedly advancing against Ukrainian defenses.[4]

While the ISW portrayed this as a significant offensive operation, in terms of territories seized there were no significant gains, even briefly. The tempo of attacks may have increased, but no significant gains were realized.

The lack of significant offensive gains by Russia did not prevent the story from reaching the pages of The New York Times.

Yet since the Kremlin named Gen. Valery V. Gerasimov to take over its struggling war effort last month, Russia has steadily added forces in Donbas, Ukrainian military officials say. Ukrainian intelligence estimates that Russia now has more than 320,000 soldiers in the country — roughly twice the size of Moscow’s initial invasion force. Western officials and military analysts have said that Moscow also has 150,000 to 250,000 soldiers in reserve, either training or being positioned inside Russia to join the fight at any time.

At no point, however, have these reserve formations translated into territorial gains in Ukraine.

The reports of Russia massing troops for a fresh offensive have popped up periodically since last December, after Ukraine’s surprisingly effective counteroffensive last fall had largely petered out.

Russia is MASSING men and arms for a new offensive. As soon as January, but more likely in the spring, it could launch a big attack from Donbas in the east, from the south or even from Belarus, a puppet state in the north. Russian troops will aim to drive back Ukrainian forces and could even stage a second attempt to take Kyiv, the capital.

Despite the persistence of these reports, however, a view of the front line between Russia and Ukraine looking back to the beginning of the year and beyond shows very little change along the front line since January 1, 2023. Bahkmut has been the most significant gain on either side in 2023.

Time and again we are told Russia is massing forces, and time and again we see no significant change on the front line. This war is well and truly stalemated.

Yet if these reports of massed Russian troops have been spurious and wrong, if the latest one of 100,000 troops is spurious and wrong, we come back to Admiral Radakin’s assessment of the Russian military. Has their capacity to wage modern war been brought so low that they lack adequate munitions and supplies to launch a major offensive, let alone one with 100,000 troops, 500 tanks, with munitions and supplies to match?

With Ukraine’s much vaunted summer counteroffensive getting repeatedly bogged down in Zaporizhzhia, Russia might be engaged in a bit of information warfare by making Ukraine worry about attacks near Kharkiv, sapping away strength and depth of forces in garrison duty that might have been better used elsewhere along the front.

One thing is clear, the one thing neither Russia nor Ukraine is doing at the moment is winning big battles. Neither side is really even fighting big battles, and stalemate along the front line remains the prevailing trend on both sides.

This is not a pathway that brings Ukraine and Russia towards peace any time soon.