1) Thank you for map of the Gulfs. No news outlet includes maps with stories anymore, and having to use more than one window will always annoy (almost as much as motion on the reading page).
2) Does anyone else find it strange that the U.S. seized (and took oil from, I believe) this same ship. it sure smells...fish-oily (sorry, I couldn't resist).
I'd say the whole of corporate media finds that curious tidbit about the Saint Nicholas more than a little strange. With the number of tankers that move in and out of the Persian Gulf, that Iran would seize this one tanker that the US had seized previously is a most amazing coincidence.
The question, though, is how does this benefit Iran? Iran seized an oil cargo bound for Turkey, not Israel or Europe. The ship has been reflagged and re-registered under a new name--it probably has different owners now.
While it may be the same physical vessel, every other aspect about the ship is now different. So why did Iran seize the tanker?
Well, I think it reasonable that the oil in question here *was* contraband, i.e. stolen from Iran, making the seizure legitimate. (I hold no allegiance or sympathy for Iran.)
And, that it was *not* bound for an Iranian enemy (although I don't think Iran and Turkey could in any way be considered allies, except maybe in both hating the Kurds), and therefore not really an escalation in the most recent brouhaha with the West, might actually have *relieved* the Iranians, as then they won't be blamed for direct confrontation.
I’m trying to read between the lines regarding these actions. About the US shooting down Houthi drones - is this pure defense, or a warning show-of-force, or serious escalation of war? Have the US and UK militaries coordinated these moves, or are their actions independent? Because if it’s a coordinated campaign, that signals war escalation, to my mind. I know you like to stick to just the facts, Mr. Kust, but with your military background, do you have any guesses on what might come next?
Is this defense or a show of force? Ultimately, "yes".
From what has been reported, the UK and the US are acting in concert--but bear in mind the operation in the Red Sea to protect shipping from Houthi missiles is a multi-national force.
As for guesses on what comes next? None of any particular insight. The Houthis will undoubtedly attempt to continue to press their missile attacks in the Red Sea. Iran will ultimately strike a negotiating position over the tanker Saint Nicholas. I don't see Iran connecting the tanker to Israel as it was bound for Turkey (no friend of Israel, although no friend of Iran either).
The wild cards in this deck still remain groups like ISIS. If ISIS pulls off more attacks inside Iran at the moment when Iran is directly flexing its muscle, I'm not sure how the power calculus would shift. At the same time, with Iran making a show of strength with the tanker seizure, the next week or so would be an excellent time for ISIS to make an impactful terror strike inside Iran. Nothing undercuts the geopolitical muscle flexing like having a terrorist group slip through your defenses and bomb something important.
Guess I need to read yesterday's post - for years it has been Israel trying to get the US into a war with Iran - now it's Iran that wants to widen the conflict? Anyone cheering the prospect and thinking it would not be costly to the US is either extremely naive or lying.
FWIW - while the dominant narrative is that ISIS is independent and an enemy of Israel, the reality is that they have had direct material support *from* Israel and are at least to some degree a proxy for them.
Recall that what really got Gen. Flynn in hot water originally was when the DIA, when he was heading it under the Obama Administration, reported the truth about our 'allies' actually supporting the establishment of an ISIS-led caliphate in Iraq/Syria. Israel wasn't named directly IIRC, but might as well have been.
George Webb and others reported at the time also about US clandestine support for ISIS.
The great complicating factor in who supports whom among Middle Eastern terror and militia groups has been the Syrian civil war. Even John Kerry admitted that aid to the forces in Syria opposing Assad likely had flowed to groups like Al-Nusra and Al Qaeda, and the article you linked includes a quote from then-VP Biden saying the same thing.
Israel isn't going to be supportive of an ISIS caliphate for the simple reason that such an entity would very quickly set its sights on Israel--bear in mind that the ISIS ambition is ultimately to recreate the Umayyad/Abbasid Caliphates, which means geographically conquering the whole of the Middle East. That does not preclude Israel or the US using elements that feed into ISIS as proxies against Bashir Assad's forces in Syria.
That ISIS claimed credit for the bombings last week in Iran shows the extent that ISIS and related militias not backed by Iran are wild cards which can completely upend any set-piece assessment of how events are unfolding in the Middle East. While some speculated that ISIS was hoping to goad Iran into retaliating against Israel with those attacks, that doesn't square with ISIS taking credit for the bombings, which lets Israel completely off the hook.
An important element to remember is that the Houthis, Hezbollah, and most if Iran's proxies in Iraq and Syria are Shi'a Muslims, as is Iran itself, while ISIS and most of the Arab world are Sunni (Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi Muslims are a reformist variant of the Sunnis). The Sunnis and the Shi'as generally regard each other as heretics (Hamas is the only Sunni groups backed by Iran, and, judging by Hamas' tactics vis-a-vis those of Shi'ite Hezbollah, Iran views them as entirely expendable cannon fodder).
Iran is also a Persian nation while the rest of the Middle East is predominantly Arab. Turkey similarly has shown interest in exercising a measure of influence in the region, although their immediate efforts appear to be more involving Syria and the Caucasus at the moment.
Thus you have competing lines of conflict within the Middle East; there is the Muslim world vs "the West" (which includes Israel), Sunni vs Shi'a, and Persian vs Arab, and Turkey vs Syria.
It also bears noting that the dominant sect within Shi'a Islam is Twelver Shi'ism, which includes an apocalyptic eschatological belief in the return of the Twelfth Imam, Muhammed al-Mahdi, whom Twelvers believe is currently in "occultation". Some speculate that the eschatology of Twelver Shi'ism is part of what drives Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, in preparation for that apocalyptic return of al-Mahdi.
One of the reasons I use the lens of Great Power Competition in assessing events in the Middle East is that is the one framework which amalgamates the religious, ethnic, and even tribal forces at play in the region into a cohesive whole. Within that framework Iran is largely jockeying with Saudi Arabia for regional hegemony, with Turkey on the northern fringe and Egypt maintaining more of an African interest. Israel becomes a fulcrum in the region both because of its geographical positioning between Syria to the north and Saudi Arabia and Egypt to the south, meaning there can be no larger melding of Arab and Muslim states in the region without involving Israel (the Abraham Accords capitalize on this by emphasizing economic cooperation over political domination).
All of which makes the Middle East an inherently unstable region ripe for war and conflict.
Yes, lots of competing interests as well as mutually convenient accommodations between parties that on the surface might appear to be competitors or enemies.
I'm inclined to accept (I think it was) Scott Ritter's early assessment that whatever the tactical outcome in Gaza, Hamas had secured a major strategic win once Israel launched its heavy-handed military response.
Palestinian statehood which had been relegated the back burner was suddenly a matter of global concern and support for the Palestine cause was a great unifier throughout the Islamic world and garnering sympathy and support from most of the rest of it.
The Abraham Accords and normalization with Israel suddenly became toxic. Even though political elites might want to pursue normalization and forget the Palestinians, the sentiments of the 'street' are vehemently otherwise. That has to be a consideration for a lot of leaders - Turkey being one example.
Erdogan would like to revive the Ottoman Empire and believes he should be a big deal in the Islamic world - so has to appear to be tough re: Israel. BUT is making plenty of money providing Israel with gas and oil and wants cooperation in taking advantage of E. Mediterranean energy resources, which would be facilitated by cooperating with them...
(Gaza happens to sit on a particularly rich corner of the so-called E. Mediterranean 'Energy Triangle).
The fact that it has mainly been the Shi'a who have stepped up to actively support the Sunni (and Christian) Palestinians has got to be a source of discomfort to Arab rulers, too. Saudi rulers can't be too happy about the quandary that the Yemen v. US/UK situation puts them in...
Particularly good article - especially re: the energy side of all this from fellow Substacker Moneycircus (Oct. '22):
The Saudis have been fighting the Houthis for years (although in recent years the Saudis have been focusing on diplomacy as an end to that conflict), and the sad truth of the Arabs in Gaza is that they aren't particularly welcome anywhere else in the Arab world--we should not overlook that it is Egypt, not Israel, that has maintained the security on Gaza's southern border, and Egypt has had an ironclad policy of NO refugees from Gaza. To put it bluntly, the Arab states really don't give a damn about the Arabs in Gaza.
At the same time, Israel freighting companies completed an overland route through Saudi Arabia and Jordan from ports on the Persian Gulf in Saudi Arabia and the UAE to replace the shipping lanes the Houthis are now menacing. This was done AFTER the Houthis began targeting ships in the Red Sea and AFTER the October 7th attacks.
Which indicates that the substance of the Abraham Accords are not nearly as toxic as some narratives are wont to suggest. Saudi Arabia might not be in a position to openly embrace the Abraham Accords while the Israeli-Hamas war is ongoing, but Saudi-Israeli rapprochement is likely to continue behind the scenes just as it has been for a number of years now. It is instructive that Jordan is the only Arab country to directly voice support for South Africa's genocide case against Israel in the ICJ is Jordan, even though the OIC and the Arab League have collectively voiced that support.
I suspect the more accurate read on Iran's support for the Arabs in Gaza is that it is less a discomfort to Saudi Arabia and more an annoyance. It's Iran stepping up once again to challenge Saudi Arabia for regional hegemony over the Persian Gulf, a role Saudi Arabia has enjoyed as the leading oil exporter (and thus leading voice in OPEC) of that region. The Saudis are, if anything, relieved that the US is taking out Houthi missile sites in Yemen and not asking the Saudis to do it themselves. MBS has visions of diversifying the Saudi economy away from oil, and one of those ambitions involves encouraging the growth of tourism along the Red Sea coast. That can't happen with Houthi missiles making the area a war zone. Hamas may have slowed formal Saudi acceptance of the Abraham Accords but the crisis in Red Sea shipping is all on the Houthis. Given past Saudi opposition to the Houthi militias, I don't see this winning the Houthis any friends in Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia's oil sector collapsed by 17% in 3Q 2023 alone. It's unlikely that it will fair much better when the Q4 numbers come out. If there's not both a renewed global demand for oil and an increase in oil prices, Saudi Arabia is going to face increasing economic pressure to develop their economy away from oil production. The one country in the Middle East that can help Saudi Arabia do that is Israel.
While the increase in shipping rates from China are a potential source of renewed inflation here in the US and in Europe, those same increased shipping rates are also making Chinese exports less attractive in the US and in Europe. At the same time, Russia is watching the price of Urals crude drop even back below the EU/G7 price cap of $60/bbl. Oil prices have trended down since the October 7th attacks, even in the face of the Houthi missile mischief and presumed Iranian efforts at a broader Middle Eastern war.
Which means the countries taking the biggest economic hits from October 7th outside of Israel are Iran, Russia, and China, NOT the US and Europe (i.e., NOT "the West"). In the meantime, if the US-led naval effort to protect the sea lanes in the Red Sea prevent cargo ships from being either attacked or damaged by the Houthis, that's a plus for US prestige in the region--which means Iran is effectively driving Saudi Arabia back towards the US after Biden's ham-handed policies pushed them away.
1) Thank you for map of the Gulfs. No news outlet includes maps with stories anymore, and having to use more than one window will always annoy (almost as much as motion on the reading page).
2) Does anyone else find it strange that the U.S. seized (and took oil from, I believe) this same ship. it sure smells...fish-oily (sorry, I couldn't resist).
I'd say the whole of corporate media finds that curious tidbit about the Saint Nicholas more than a little strange. With the number of tankers that move in and out of the Persian Gulf, that Iran would seize this one tanker that the US had seized previously is a most amazing coincidence.
The question, though, is how does this benefit Iran? Iran seized an oil cargo bound for Turkey, not Israel or Europe. The ship has been reflagged and re-registered under a new name--it probably has different owners now.
While it may be the same physical vessel, every other aspect about the ship is now different. So why did Iran seize the tanker?
Well, I think it reasonable that the oil in question here *was* contraband, i.e. stolen from Iran, making the seizure legitimate. (I hold no allegiance or sympathy for Iran.)
And, that it was *not* bound for an Iranian enemy (although I don't think Iran and Turkey could in any way be considered allies, except maybe in both hating the Kurds), and therefore not really an escalation in the most recent brouhaha with the West, might actually have *relieved* the Iranians, as then they won't be blamed for direct confrontation.
I’m trying to read between the lines regarding these actions. About the US shooting down Houthi drones - is this pure defense, or a warning show-of-force, or serious escalation of war? Have the US and UK militaries coordinated these moves, or are their actions independent? Because if it’s a coordinated campaign, that signals war escalation, to my mind. I know you like to stick to just the facts, Mr. Kust, but with your military background, do you have any guesses on what might come next?
Is this defense or a show of force? Ultimately, "yes".
From what has been reported, the UK and the US are acting in concert--but bear in mind the operation in the Red Sea to protect shipping from Houthi missiles is a multi-national force.
As for guesses on what comes next? None of any particular insight. The Houthis will undoubtedly attempt to continue to press their missile attacks in the Red Sea. Iran will ultimately strike a negotiating position over the tanker Saint Nicholas. I don't see Iran connecting the tanker to Israel as it was bound for Turkey (no friend of Israel, although no friend of Iran either).
The wild cards in this deck still remain groups like ISIS. If ISIS pulls off more attacks inside Iran at the moment when Iran is directly flexing its muscle, I'm not sure how the power calculus would shift. At the same time, with Iran making a show of strength with the tanker seizure, the next week or so would be an excellent time for ISIS to make an impactful terror strike inside Iran. Nothing undercuts the geopolitical muscle flexing like having a terrorist group slip through your defenses and bomb something important.
Guess I need to read yesterday's post - for years it has been Israel trying to get the US into a war with Iran - now it's Iran that wants to widen the conflict? Anyone cheering the prospect and thinking it would not be costly to the US is either extremely naive or lying.
FWIW - while the dominant narrative is that ISIS is independent and an enemy of Israel, the reality is that they have had direct material support *from* Israel and are at least to some degree a proxy for them.
Recall that what really got Gen. Flynn in hot water originally was when the DIA, when he was heading it under the Obama Administration, reported the truth about our 'allies' actually supporting the establishment of an ISIS-led caliphate in Iraq/Syria. Israel wasn't named directly IIRC, but might as well have been.
George Webb and others reported at the time also about US clandestine support for ISIS.
Thanks for covering this stuff.
https://www.globalresearch.ca/israeli-military-admits-to-supporting-al-qaeda-and-isis-in-syria/5464484
The great complicating factor in who supports whom among Middle Eastern terror and militia groups has been the Syrian civil war. Even John Kerry admitted that aid to the forces in Syria opposing Assad likely had flowed to groups like Al-Nusra and Al Qaeda, and the article you linked includes a quote from then-VP Biden saying the same thing.
Israel isn't going to be supportive of an ISIS caliphate for the simple reason that such an entity would very quickly set its sights on Israel--bear in mind that the ISIS ambition is ultimately to recreate the Umayyad/Abbasid Caliphates, which means geographically conquering the whole of the Middle East. That does not preclude Israel or the US using elements that feed into ISIS as proxies against Bashir Assad's forces in Syria.
That ISIS claimed credit for the bombings last week in Iran shows the extent that ISIS and related militias not backed by Iran are wild cards which can completely upend any set-piece assessment of how events are unfolding in the Middle East. While some speculated that ISIS was hoping to goad Iran into retaliating against Israel with those attacks, that doesn't square with ISIS taking credit for the bombings, which lets Israel completely off the hook.
An important element to remember is that the Houthis, Hezbollah, and most if Iran's proxies in Iraq and Syria are Shi'a Muslims, as is Iran itself, while ISIS and most of the Arab world are Sunni (Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi Muslims are a reformist variant of the Sunnis). The Sunnis and the Shi'as generally regard each other as heretics (Hamas is the only Sunni groups backed by Iran, and, judging by Hamas' tactics vis-a-vis those of Shi'ite Hezbollah, Iran views them as entirely expendable cannon fodder).
Iran is also a Persian nation while the rest of the Middle East is predominantly Arab. Turkey similarly has shown interest in exercising a measure of influence in the region, although their immediate efforts appear to be more involving Syria and the Caucasus at the moment.
Thus you have competing lines of conflict within the Middle East; there is the Muslim world vs "the West" (which includes Israel), Sunni vs Shi'a, and Persian vs Arab, and Turkey vs Syria.
It also bears noting that the dominant sect within Shi'a Islam is Twelver Shi'ism, which includes an apocalyptic eschatological belief in the return of the Twelfth Imam, Muhammed al-Mahdi, whom Twelvers believe is currently in "occultation". Some speculate that the eschatology of Twelver Shi'ism is part of what drives Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, in preparation for that apocalyptic return of al-Mahdi.
One of the reasons I use the lens of Great Power Competition in assessing events in the Middle East is that is the one framework which amalgamates the religious, ethnic, and even tribal forces at play in the region into a cohesive whole. Within that framework Iran is largely jockeying with Saudi Arabia for regional hegemony, with Turkey on the northern fringe and Egypt maintaining more of an African interest. Israel becomes a fulcrum in the region both because of its geographical positioning between Syria to the north and Saudi Arabia and Egypt to the south, meaning there can be no larger melding of Arab and Muslim states in the region without involving Israel (the Abraham Accords capitalize on this by emphasizing economic cooperation over political domination).
All of which makes the Middle East an inherently unstable region ripe for war and conflict.
Yes, lots of competing interests as well as mutually convenient accommodations between parties that on the surface might appear to be competitors or enemies.
I'm inclined to accept (I think it was) Scott Ritter's early assessment that whatever the tactical outcome in Gaza, Hamas had secured a major strategic win once Israel launched its heavy-handed military response.
Palestinian statehood which had been relegated the back burner was suddenly a matter of global concern and support for the Palestine cause was a great unifier throughout the Islamic world and garnering sympathy and support from most of the rest of it.
The Abraham Accords and normalization with Israel suddenly became toxic. Even though political elites might want to pursue normalization and forget the Palestinians, the sentiments of the 'street' are vehemently otherwise. That has to be a consideration for a lot of leaders - Turkey being one example.
Erdogan would like to revive the Ottoman Empire and believes he should be a big deal in the Islamic world - so has to appear to be tough re: Israel. BUT is making plenty of money providing Israel with gas and oil and wants cooperation in taking advantage of E. Mediterranean energy resources, which would be facilitated by cooperating with them...
(Gaza happens to sit on a particularly rich corner of the so-called E. Mediterranean 'Energy Triangle).
The fact that it has mainly been the Shi'a who have stepped up to actively support the Sunni (and Christian) Palestinians has got to be a source of discomfort to Arab rulers, too. Saudi rulers can't be too happy about the quandary that the Yemen v. US/UK situation puts them in...
Particularly good article - especially re: the energy side of all this from fellow Substacker Moneycircus (Oct. '22):
https://moneycircus.substack.com/p/insight-europe-gas-and-the-endgame
The Saudis have been fighting the Houthis for years (although in recent years the Saudis have been focusing on diplomacy as an end to that conflict), and the sad truth of the Arabs in Gaza is that they aren't particularly welcome anywhere else in the Arab world--we should not overlook that it is Egypt, not Israel, that has maintained the security on Gaza's southern border, and Egypt has had an ironclad policy of NO refugees from Gaza. To put it bluntly, the Arab states really don't give a damn about the Arabs in Gaza.
At the same time, Israel freighting companies completed an overland route through Saudi Arabia and Jordan from ports on the Persian Gulf in Saudi Arabia and the UAE to replace the shipping lanes the Houthis are now menacing. This was done AFTER the Houthis began targeting ships in the Red Sea and AFTER the October 7th attacks.
Which indicates that the substance of the Abraham Accords are not nearly as toxic as some narratives are wont to suggest. Saudi Arabia might not be in a position to openly embrace the Abraham Accords while the Israeli-Hamas war is ongoing, but Saudi-Israeli rapprochement is likely to continue behind the scenes just as it has been for a number of years now. It is instructive that Jordan is the only Arab country to directly voice support for South Africa's genocide case against Israel in the ICJ is Jordan, even though the OIC and the Arab League have collectively voiced that support.
I suspect the more accurate read on Iran's support for the Arabs in Gaza is that it is less a discomfort to Saudi Arabia and more an annoyance. It's Iran stepping up once again to challenge Saudi Arabia for regional hegemony over the Persian Gulf, a role Saudi Arabia has enjoyed as the leading oil exporter (and thus leading voice in OPEC) of that region. The Saudis are, if anything, relieved that the US is taking out Houthi missile sites in Yemen and not asking the Saudis to do it themselves. MBS has visions of diversifying the Saudi economy away from oil, and one of those ambitions involves encouraging the growth of tourism along the Red Sea coast. That can't happen with Houthi missiles making the area a war zone. Hamas may have slowed formal Saudi acceptance of the Abraham Accords but the crisis in Red Sea shipping is all on the Houthis. Given past Saudi opposition to the Houthi militias, I don't see this winning the Houthis any friends in Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia's oil sector collapsed by 17% in 3Q 2023 alone. It's unlikely that it will fair much better when the Q4 numbers come out. If there's not both a renewed global demand for oil and an increase in oil prices, Saudi Arabia is going to face increasing economic pressure to develop their economy away from oil production. The one country in the Middle East that can help Saudi Arabia do that is Israel.
While the increase in shipping rates from China are a potential source of renewed inflation here in the US and in Europe, those same increased shipping rates are also making Chinese exports less attractive in the US and in Europe. At the same time, Russia is watching the price of Urals crude drop even back below the EU/G7 price cap of $60/bbl. Oil prices have trended down since the October 7th attacks, even in the face of the Houthi missile mischief and presumed Iranian efforts at a broader Middle Eastern war.
Which means the countries taking the biggest economic hits from October 7th outside of Israel are Iran, Russia, and China, NOT the US and Europe (i.e., NOT "the West"). In the meantime, if the US-led naval effort to protect the sea lanes in the Red Sea prevent cargo ships from being either attacked or damaged by the Houthis, that's a plus for US prestige in the region--which means Iran is effectively driving Saudi Arabia back towards the US after Biden's ham-handed policies pushed them away.