The Saudis have been fighting the Houthis for years (although in recent years the Saudis have been focusing on diplomacy as an end to that conflict), and the sad truth of the Arabs in Gaza is that they aren't particularly welcome anywhere else in the Arab world--we should not overlook that it is Egypt, not Israel, that has maintained the…
The Saudis have been fighting the Houthis for years (although in recent years the Saudis have been focusing on diplomacy as an end to that conflict), and the sad truth of the Arabs in Gaza is that they aren't particularly welcome anywhere else in the Arab world--we should not overlook that it is Egypt, not Israel, that has maintained the security on Gaza's southern border, and Egypt has had an ironclad policy of NO refugees from Gaza. To put it bluntly, the Arab states really don't give a damn about the Arabs in Gaza.
At the same time, Israel freighting companies completed an overland route through Saudi Arabia and Jordan from ports on the Persian Gulf in Saudi Arabia and the UAE to replace the shipping lanes the Houthis are now menacing. This was done AFTER the Houthis began targeting ships in the Red Sea and AFTER the October 7th attacks.
Which indicates that the substance of the Abraham Accords are not nearly as toxic as some narratives are wont to suggest. Saudi Arabia might not be in a position to openly embrace the Abraham Accords while the Israeli-Hamas war is ongoing, but Saudi-Israeli rapprochement is likely to continue behind the scenes just as it has been for a number of years now. It is instructive that Jordan is the only Arab country to directly voice support for South Africa's genocide case against Israel in the ICJ is Jordan, even though the OIC and the Arab League have collectively voiced that support.
I suspect the more accurate read on Iran's support for the Arabs in Gaza is that it is less a discomfort to Saudi Arabia and more an annoyance. It's Iran stepping up once again to challenge Saudi Arabia for regional hegemony over the Persian Gulf, a role Saudi Arabia has enjoyed as the leading oil exporter (and thus leading voice in OPEC) of that region. The Saudis are, if anything, relieved that the US is taking out Houthi missile sites in Yemen and not asking the Saudis to do it themselves. MBS has visions of diversifying the Saudi economy away from oil, and one of those ambitions involves encouraging the growth of tourism along the Red Sea coast. That can't happen with Houthi missiles making the area a war zone. Hamas may have slowed formal Saudi acceptance of the Abraham Accords but the crisis in Red Sea shipping is all on the Houthis. Given past Saudi opposition to the Houthi militias, I don't see this winning the Houthis any friends in Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia's oil sector collapsed by 17% in 3Q 2023 alone. It's unlikely that it will fair much better when the Q4 numbers come out. If there's not both a renewed global demand for oil and an increase in oil prices, Saudi Arabia is going to face increasing economic pressure to develop their economy away from oil production. The one country in the Middle East that can help Saudi Arabia do that is Israel.
While the increase in shipping rates from China are a potential source of renewed inflation here in the US and in Europe, those same increased shipping rates are also making Chinese exports less attractive in the US and in Europe. At the same time, Russia is watching the price of Urals crude drop even back below the EU/G7 price cap of $60/bbl. Oil prices have trended down since the October 7th attacks, even in the face of the Houthi missile mischief and presumed Iranian efforts at a broader Middle Eastern war.
Which means the countries taking the biggest economic hits from October 7th outside of Israel are Iran, Russia, and China, NOT the US and Europe (i.e., NOT "the West"). In the meantime, if the US-led naval effort to protect the sea lanes in the Red Sea prevent cargo ships from being either attacked or damaged by the Houthis, that's a plus for US prestige in the region--which means Iran is effectively driving Saudi Arabia back towards the US after Biden's ham-handed policies pushed them away.
The Saudis have been fighting the Houthis for years (although in recent years the Saudis have been focusing on diplomacy as an end to that conflict), and the sad truth of the Arabs in Gaza is that they aren't particularly welcome anywhere else in the Arab world--we should not overlook that it is Egypt, not Israel, that has maintained the security on Gaza's southern border, and Egypt has had an ironclad policy of NO refugees from Gaza. To put it bluntly, the Arab states really don't give a damn about the Arabs in Gaza.
At the same time, Israel freighting companies completed an overland route through Saudi Arabia and Jordan from ports on the Persian Gulf in Saudi Arabia and the UAE to replace the shipping lanes the Houthis are now menacing. This was done AFTER the Houthis began targeting ships in the Red Sea and AFTER the October 7th attacks.
Which indicates that the substance of the Abraham Accords are not nearly as toxic as some narratives are wont to suggest. Saudi Arabia might not be in a position to openly embrace the Abraham Accords while the Israeli-Hamas war is ongoing, but Saudi-Israeli rapprochement is likely to continue behind the scenes just as it has been for a number of years now. It is instructive that Jordan is the only Arab country to directly voice support for South Africa's genocide case against Israel in the ICJ is Jordan, even though the OIC and the Arab League have collectively voiced that support.
I suspect the more accurate read on Iran's support for the Arabs in Gaza is that it is less a discomfort to Saudi Arabia and more an annoyance. It's Iran stepping up once again to challenge Saudi Arabia for regional hegemony over the Persian Gulf, a role Saudi Arabia has enjoyed as the leading oil exporter (and thus leading voice in OPEC) of that region. The Saudis are, if anything, relieved that the US is taking out Houthi missile sites in Yemen and not asking the Saudis to do it themselves. MBS has visions of diversifying the Saudi economy away from oil, and one of those ambitions involves encouraging the growth of tourism along the Red Sea coast. That can't happen with Houthi missiles making the area a war zone. Hamas may have slowed formal Saudi acceptance of the Abraham Accords but the crisis in Red Sea shipping is all on the Houthis. Given past Saudi opposition to the Houthi militias, I don't see this winning the Houthis any friends in Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia's oil sector collapsed by 17% in 3Q 2023 alone. It's unlikely that it will fair much better when the Q4 numbers come out. If there's not both a renewed global demand for oil and an increase in oil prices, Saudi Arabia is going to face increasing economic pressure to develop their economy away from oil production. The one country in the Middle East that can help Saudi Arabia do that is Israel.
While the increase in shipping rates from China are a potential source of renewed inflation here in the US and in Europe, those same increased shipping rates are also making Chinese exports less attractive in the US and in Europe. At the same time, Russia is watching the price of Urals crude drop even back below the EU/G7 price cap of $60/bbl. Oil prices have trended down since the October 7th attacks, even in the face of the Houthi missile mischief and presumed Iranian efforts at a broader Middle Eastern war.
Which means the countries taking the biggest economic hits from October 7th outside of Israel are Iran, Russia, and China, NOT the US and Europe (i.e., NOT "the West"). In the meantime, if the US-led naval effort to protect the sea lanes in the Red Sea prevent cargo ships from being either attacked or damaged by the Houthis, that's a plus for US prestige in the region--which means Iran is effectively driving Saudi Arabia back towards the US after Biden's ham-handed policies pushed them away.