Regardless of how events on the battlefield ultimately unfold, one reality seems unavoidable: Russian business—in this instance, the Moscow Stock Exchange—is showing precious little confidence in Putin’s strategy. Ever since the beginning of the war the index has trended lower and lower; if investors believed the war would end well for Russia and Russian business the index would be moving higher on a sustainable basis.
Even if Russian forces ultimately prevail in Ukraine (a likely outcome in a war of attrition, simply because Russia can throw more men and material into the meatgrinder of battle), the costs and consequences of that war could easily turn the military victory into a Pyrrhic one, leaving Russia’s economy devastated and collapsing.
As I recall, the Russian Army used Russia’s natural depth and naturally harsh winter to demolish La Grande Armee. While Borodino was a bloody battle, the casualties were high on both sides.
Still, technically Napoleon won the battle, and had the Russians not burned Moscow, leaving him no chance to winter there, the outcome of the Russian campaign would have ended very differently.
Against the Wermacht, many of the same tactics were used, particularly in flipping the occupation of Stalingrad into the largest trap in military history. However, you are correct that a frequent criticism of Marshal Zhukov was that he was rather indifferent to Russian casualties, and the quality of Russian training contributed to some very high casualty rates.
However, there are some military theorists who believe that had Hitler not invested so much at Stalingrad, the outcome on the Russian front could have been different. That's a bit of a reach, in my view, because the Wermacht never had the logistics and the resources to sustain major military operations so far afield.
Russia’s basic tactical doctrine, from all that I have read, is basically make the invader pay for every inch of Russian soil, casualties be damned.
As a defensive doctrine, it works. Russia’s problem is that they are the invader, not the invaded. And Russian invasions of Europe have always gone very badly, from Austerlitz to Tannerburg to their disastrous 1917 offensive.
NATO, perhaps. Ukraine seems pretty highly motivated to make Russia bleed. And if the casualty estimates we're seeing are even halfway correct (and the one thing that is certain is that the Russian assertions of low casualties and 95% of wounded being returned to the front lines are pure horse hockey--if that were true there'd be no need for 300,000 conscripts), Russia is doing a fair bit of bleeding in Ukraine.
NATO's strategy in Ukraine is cynical but frankly effective. NATO provides the hardware, Ukraine provides the cannon fodder. Even if Russia ultimately wins their army will be in no shape to fight anywhere else, and their economic isolation will by that point be more or less permanent. (And if you look at a map of Russian pipelines, if they can't sell oil and gas to Europe or transit through tanker terminals in the Baltic, they don't sell much oil or gas).
NATO weapons are outperforming Russian weapons, Ukrainian troops are more motivated (and some analysts argue better trained, but that might be a problematic conclusion), and if NATO and the EU hold together through the winter, Russia's energy advantage evaporates faster than the gas bubbling up from the Nordstream pipelines.
Russia's disastrous WW1 campaigns against Germany helped end the Romanov dynasty. Stalin became "Uncle Joe" because it was all about defending Mother Russia (never mind that Russia helped kickstart WW2 with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939).
Putin may think he's a strongman in the Stalin mold, but history is making him look more like Nicholas II--and that's not a good comparison for his physical health going forward.
Do you think their aligning with the BRICS will succeed or backfire? I imagine that's why they made those moves in order to soften any retaliatory blows from the West.
Interesting.
Isn't that what they did against La Grande Armee and the Nazis? That is. throw men at the problem?
I could be wrong, but my impression from reading Russian history and literature, is producing great strategic Generals isn't a strong suit.
As I recall, the Russian Army used Russia’s natural depth and naturally harsh winter to demolish La Grande Armee. While Borodino was a bloody battle, the casualties were high on both sides.
Still, technically Napoleon won the battle, and had the Russians not burned Moscow, leaving him no chance to winter there, the outcome of the Russian campaign would have ended very differently.
Against the Wermacht, many of the same tactics were used, particularly in flipping the occupation of Stalingrad into the largest trap in military history. However, you are correct that a frequent criticism of Marshal Zhukov was that he was rather indifferent to Russian casualties, and the quality of Russian training contributed to some very high casualty rates.
However, there are some military theorists who believe that had Hitler not invested so much at Stalingrad, the outcome on the Russian front could have been different. That's a bit of a reach, in my view, because the Wermacht never had the logistics and the resources to sustain major military operations so far afield.
Russia’s basic tactical doctrine, from all that I have read, is basically make the invader pay for every inch of Russian soil, casualties be damned.
As a defensive doctrine, it works. Russia’s problem is that they are the invader, not the invaded. And Russian invasions of Europe have always gone very badly, from Austerlitz to Tannerburg to their disastrous 1917 offensive.
Yes, they simply froze the French to death. The Russians have in their history the tolerance for wars of attrition - or trench warfare.
This war we're witnessing will be determined by who wants it more. Russia is more than willing to fight to its end because of this. The West less so.
NATO, perhaps. Ukraine seems pretty highly motivated to make Russia bleed. And if the casualty estimates we're seeing are even halfway correct (and the one thing that is certain is that the Russian assertions of low casualties and 95% of wounded being returned to the front lines are pure horse hockey--if that were true there'd be no need for 300,000 conscripts), Russia is doing a fair bit of bleeding in Ukraine.
NATO's strategy in Ukraine is cynical but frankly effective. NATO provides the hardware, Ukraine provides the cannon fodder. Even if Russia ultimately wins their army will be in no shape to fight anywhere else, and their economic isolation will by that point be more or less permanent. (And if you look at a map of Russian pipelines, if they can't sell oil and gas to Europe or transit through tanker terminals in the Baltic, they don't sell much oil or gas).
NATO weapons are outperforming Russian weapons, Ukrainian troops are more motivated (and some analysts argue better trained, but that might be a problematic conclusion), and if NATO and the EU hold together through the winter, Russia's energy advantage evaporates faster than the gas bubbling up from the Nordstream pipelines.
Russia's disastrous WW1 campaigns against Germany helped end the Romanov dynasty. Stalin became "Uncle Joe" because it was all about defending Mother Russia (never mind that Russia helped kickstart WW2 with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939).
Putin may think he's a strongman in the Stalin mold, but history is making him look more like Nicholas II--and that's not a good comparison for his physical health going forward.
Do you think their aligning with the BRICS will succeed or backfire? I imagine that's why they made those moves in order to soften any retaliatory blows from the West.
Great analysis!