Putin Raises The Stakes For Everyone
Ukraine Is The Battlefield. Not The Prize.
By far the most significant news yesterday was Putin’s not-entirely-unexpected partial mobilization of Russia and the conscription of 300,000 troops for Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.
While 300,000 troops is a substantial force by any reckoning, it is slighly more than 1% of Russia’s total reservist force of 25 million. Officially, only combat veterans are being recalled to active duty.
Only those with relevant combat and service experience will be mobilized, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said. He added that there are around 25 million people who fit this criteria, but only around 1% of them will be mobilized.
Putin is clearly escalating the conflict in Ukraine—a sign some (western corporate media in particular) interpret as proof Russia is losing in Ukraine.
The Kremlin has insisted that what it calls its “special military operation” in Ukraine is going according to plan, but military observers have said Russian forces are depleted and increasingly dispirited.
Whether or not this is actually the case is inherently problematic. What is considerably less problematic is that, while Russia is fighting in Ukraine, Russia is not fighting over Ukraine, and the partial mobilization of Russian reserves merely underscores that reality. Ukraine is the battlefield, but in Putin’s eyes (and, again, those at least of western corporate media and western “military observers”), the fight is an existential conflict with NATO and the EU.
It is a fight Putin wants very much to win.
Putin Once Again Blames NATO For The War
We should not lose sight of an essential reality of Russia’s “special military operation”: Putin has from the start sought to lay the blame on NATO and the US. In his address to the Russian people on February 21, when he first authorized sending “peacekeeping forces” into the Donbass, he spoke of the US in effect running the Ukrainian government from its embassy in Kyiv.
Putin doubled down on this “blame the West”1 rhetoric a few days later when the “special military operation” formally commenced.
For 30 years we have been trying to agree with the leading NATO countries on the principles of equal and indivisible security in Europe. In response, they constantly faced either cynical deceit and lies, or attempts at pressure and blackmail. The alliance, meanwhile, is steadily expanding, the military machine is moving and is approaching our borders closely.
I will note here that, in this article, I am focusing solely on what Putin has actually said. The extent and legitimacy of Russian grievances against the West is a topic far too complex to be summarized briefly here, and, ultimately, is moot. Right or wrong, fair or unfair, Putin at every turn has put the onus of this war squarely on the US.
This rhetoric returned in his latest address, as he once again cast the “special military operation” as a defense of Russia against existential threats from NATO and the US.
The purpose of this West is to weaken, divide and ultimately destroy our country. They are already directly saying that in 1991 they were able to split the Soviet Union, and now the time has come for Russia itself, that it should disintegrate into many mortally hostile regions and regions.
Nor is this rhetoric new in 2022. In a lengthy essay published in July of 2021 on the official website for the President of Russia, Putin laid many of the same claims and charges against the West.
Step by step, Ukraine was dragged into a dangerous geopolitical game aimed at turning Ukraine into a barrier between Europe and Russia, a springboard against Russia. Inevitably, there came a time when the concept of ”Ukraine is not Russia“ was no longer an option. There was a need for the ”anti-Russia“ concept which we will never accept.
Like all political rhetoric, whether Putin himself genuinely believes these statements is not terribly relevant. These are the arguments he is advancing to justify war with Ukraine to the Russian people, and these are the arguments he is advancing to justify recalling to active duty 300,000 Russian reservists.
Unsurprisingly, the West’s collective response was to dismiss Putin’s rationale and condemn the bellicose rhetoric, calling the February 21 speech a “speech to the Russian people to authorize a War.” In a similar vein, the West’s collective response to Putin’s mobilization speech and order was to interpret it as meaning Russia was losing in Ukraine.
British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace described Putin’s mobilization announcement as “an admission that his invasion is failing.”
“He and his defense minister have sent tens of thousands of their own citizens to their deaths, ill-equipped and badly led,” Wallace said in a statement. “No amount of threats and propaganda can hide the fact that Ukraine is winning this war, the international community are united and Russia is becoming a global pariah.”
Rhetorically, at least, the Ukrainian conflict has from the start been about a good deal more than just Ukraine. Putin has consistently sought to frame Ukraine as a proxy for a broader conflict with the West—NATO and Europe, primarily—and officials from NATO and Europe have collectively validated the talking point.
The War Has Not Gone As Planned
While “assessments” by outsiders should always be viewed with suspicion, the corporate media has nevertheless broadcast assessments by Western observers that the war is not going well for Russia, and that Russia is losing valuable troops and personnel in what is ultimately a losing bid to conquer Ukraine.
Russian casualties in Ukraine continue to be high, and as a result, the effectiveness of the Russian military continues to decrease over time.
For example, during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the east last week, the Russian military lost almost two brigades worth of equipment while trying to flee from the Ukrainian onslaught.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense claimed that as of Sunday, Ukrainian forces have killed approximately 54,480 Russian troops (and wounded approximately thrice that number), destroyed 251 fighter, attack, and transport jets, 217 attack and transport helicopters, 2,210 tanks, 1,309 artillery pieces, 4,718 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 312 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), 15 boats and cutters, 3,578 vehicles and fuel tanks, 168 anti-aircraft batteries, 918 tactical unmanned aerial systems, 122 special equipment platforms, such as bridging vehicles, and four mobile Iskander ballistic missile systems, and 238 cruise missiles shot down by the Ukrainian air defenses.
While these numbers are not entirely confirmed (and in large measure cannot be entirely confirmed), there is enough independent video footage of Ukrainian battlefields (example from YouTube here) to conclude that Russia has endured significant casualties and material losses.
That Putin feels an additional 300,000 troops are needed in Ukraine is difficult to see as anything other than an admission that the war to date has not gone according to plan. Indeed, sifting through Russian coverage of the conscription announcement provides teaser hints that Russian casualties are higher than have been acknowledged.
As reported by RIA Novosti, Russian officials have claimed Ukraine has suffered significant losses in combat against Russian forces.
“Although Ukraine has already lost a significant part of its military equipment and personnel, the Armed Forces of Ukraine remain combat-ready,” Konstantin Sokolov, vice-president of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, tells RIA Novosti. “Recently, there has been an internationalization of the conflict - there are more and more foreign mercenaries and military advisers in the ranks of the Ukrainian army. In some units, they are in the majority. Plus, several waves of mobilization have already passed. There are simply more Ukrainian military at the front than ours. And in order to attack, you need to have a numerical superiority."
The “internationalization”—an alleged influx of “foreign mercenaries”— is a necessary rationale for Ukraine’s ongoing combat capability in the face of over 50% casualties (a casualty rate which would all but eliminate most fighting units as a coherent fighting force).
Sokolov recalled that Russia introduced a relatively small contingent into Ukraine - 120-150 thousand. At the same time, there were about 200 thousand in the pre-war Armed Forces of Ukraine. If we sum up all the power units, then Kyiv can put a million under arms. Russia's mobilization resource, according to Shoigu, is 25 million.
Yet Russia’s stated “need” for more troops is contradicted by the official rhetoric coming out of the Kremlin, which reports almost no losses despite 6 months of intense combat.
Losses of the Russian army - 5937 people. More than 90% of the wounded returned to duty - thanks to the doctors.
Moreover, if Russian casualties have been light, one has to wonder the need for Russia to “replenish” its forces.
Nevertheless, Ukraine is hastily arming itself. Before the autumn thaw, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have the opportunity to strike in several directions. In the coming days, we should expect aggravation along the entire front line. Kyiv is unlikely to miss the chance to attack Russian units and formations until they are replenished by reservists, and launch rocket and artillery strikes on the referendum venues.
For Russian casualty estimates to be believed, one has to accept the premise that Russia needs to augment its fighting force with a troop total equal to twice the original contingent size on day one of the “special military operation”, and that this need arises despite Ukraine having suffered 50%+ casualties while Russia has suffered barely 5%.
Yet it’s not merely troop losses that are at issue. Putin’s address on the partial mobilization also called on Russia’s defense industries to increase production of weapons and other equipment.
I will add that the decree on partial mobilization also provides for additional measures to fulfill the state defense order. The heads of defense industry enterprises are directly responsible for solving the tasks of increasing the production of weapons and military equipment, and deploying additional production capacity. In turn, all issues of material, resource and financial support for defense enterprises should be resolved by the government immediately.
That Putin felt obligated to issue such orders is pretty strong evidence that Russia has suffered significant equipment losses, and falls in line with western media reports to that effect.
The one inescapable conclusion from all of this is that Putin’s “special military operation” has not gone at all as planned, and a much more serious military effort is required in Ukraine.
Annexations Are Not Merely Consolidations Of Conquests
It is also important to recognize that Putin’s escalation is not merely military in nature. On Tuesday, in advance of the mobilization decree, the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russian forces announced the intent to hold referenda on whether to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation.
Given the presence of Russian forces already in these territories, western observers have made the rather obvious assessment that the votes are certain to go Russia’s way.
Yet the votes carry a strategic military significance as well—one that has been openly acknowledged by Russian officials.
Dmitry Medvedev, who is also a former prime minister, said that ballots in the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk republics to integrate into Russia would help protect residents of the east Ukraine region by expanding Moscow’s military mandate.
“Encroachment into Russian territory is a crime and if it is committed, that allows you to use all possible force in self-defence,” Medvedev, the deputy chairman of Russia’s security council said on social media.
By pressing these referenda at this particular juncture, Russia is openly seeking to alter the nature of the conflict to an outright defense of “Russian” territory. On paper at least, votes in the occupied territories to become “Russian” rather than “Ukrainian” turns Russia into the “defender” and Ukraine into the “invader”.
Given that Russian nuclear doctrine allows and calls for the use of nuclear weapons when the Russian state itself faces an “existential” threat, formal annexation of the occupied territories theoretically presents a possible justification for a nuclear strike—something to which Putin alluded in his speech.
Nuclear blackmail also came into play. We are talking not only about the shelling of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, which is encouraged by the West, which threatens a nuclear catastrophe, but also about the statements of some high-ranking representatives of the leading NATO states about the possibility and admissibility of using weapons of mass destruction against Russia - nuclear weapons. To those who allow themselves such statements about Russia, I want to remind you that our country also has various means of destruction, and in some components more modern than those of the NATO countries. And if the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will certainly use all the means at our disposal to protect Russia and our people. It's not a bluff.
Formal annexation extends Russian claims of “territorial integrity” to include portions of what even Putin acknowledged to be Ukrainian territory, albeit territory seeking independence from the Kyiv government, at the outset of this conflict. Claims of territorial integrity also open the door to escalated charges against western nations supplying military aid to Ukraine—a point also openly acknowledged by Medvedev.
Putin Is At War With The West
Putin’s rhetoric has been clear from the beginning that this is more than just a conflict over Ukraine. Putin is, at least in his own mind, already at war with the entirety of NATO and the EU. Whether he viewed Ukraine’s pro-Western government in Kyiv as a true existential threat to Russia or simply perceived a possible opportunity to split the NATO alliance and even fracture the EU itself is problematic, but Putin’s eyes have never been on just Ukraine.
Ukraine is merely the battlefield. The prize—at least for Putin—is Russia’s future within the European community of nations. Will Russia be able to exert hegemonic influence in Europe in a fashion reminiscent of the Soviet-era Warsaw Pact? That is certainly a reasonable inference of Putin’s ultimate strategic objectives behind the “special military operation.”
That desire for hegemonic influence also fits in well with Putin’s own comments regarding the European Union’s accustomed reliance on Russian natural gas to fill its energy needs.
Putin seeking to restore Nord Stream 2 as an acceptable pipeline for transportin Russian natural gas to Europe without transiting Ukrainian territory at a minimum implies an objective of depriving Ukraine of the pipeline revenues it enjoyed (and technically still enjoys) for all the Russian pipelines which traverse its territory. Viewed more broadly, such an objective is also tantamount to Russia seeking to decide whom can profit from its energy exports to Europe, and on what terms.
Bear in mind that Nord Stream 2 had not actually come on line, although it has been completed, and has yet to actually transport natural gas from Russia to European customers. Europe’s consumption of Russian natural gas has been, up to the beginning of this war in Ukraine—for Putin’s “special military operation” is a war no matter the label used—serviced by Nord Stream 1 and by pipelines which traverse Ukrainian territory. Thus for Putin to make Nord Stream 2 a potential bargaining chip in what peace will cost Europe carries a larger strategic implication than simply lifting European sanctions on Russia for invading Ukraine.
A world without Russian energy is a world that, in the near term at least, is able to produce less.
Thus Putin’s escalation becomes almost automatically a global escalation of the conflict. As the war in Ukraine impacts every nation, so to does this latest escalation.
NATO has to decide whether to risk possible nuclear war if it continues to supply Ukraine with weapons. China has to decide if Putin is the the right horse to back in this contest. India has to decide if building up its oil reserves with Russian oil is a wise strategic move. Countries dependent on Russian and Ukrainian grain exports have to come to grips with the reality that this conflict—and its disruptions of Russian and Ukrainian exports—is going to continue into the foreseeable future.
For Putin, this has likely been one of this war’s unstated objectives—Russian geopolitical prominence. Putin has long wanted Russia to be a nation of stature and prominence in the world, much as the Soviet Union was in its heyday. In that regard at least, Putin has already won a major victory: Russia is relevant to everyone now.
All quotes from Russian sources are translated into English courtesy of Google Translate, except where otherwise indicated, which translations are then archived at archive.today.
As we look around the world it seems most leaders are paddling canoes toward waterfalls.
If only one or two showed the slightest hint that they might begin to paddle in the opposite direction, then financial markets would still need to judge whether it is too late already. We'll soon see.