Of course the Russian citizens are paying. But if it's really a "war of attrition", Russia seems likely to win in the end. 150 million people vs. 40 million people, and a GDP almost an order of magnitude larger.
Will enough Russian citizens tire of it first to change that? Good question. Historically, Russians have a a great deal of resolve when it comes to wars -- just ask Napoleon or Hitler.
Russia does very well against invaders (Napoleon and Hitler).
Russia does very poorly as the invaders (Austerlitz, Tannenburg, First and Second Masurian Lakes, the disastrous offensives of 1917 that ultimately led to mass mutinies within the Russian army).
Being the invaders, Russia's manpower advantages long term largely disappear, and if the news reports of a mass exodus of young Russian men after Putin's partial mobilization announcement are even partly true, there is no manpower advantage in the end. Russia's young men will simply not show up for the fight.
The economic questions are a good deal murkier. Yes, Russia has a larger GDP, but, based on Russia sourcing drones from Iran and Putin's "economic mobilization" orders earlier this week, the Russian economy is not doing a good job of keeping the Russian military supplied with basic resources: bullets, artillery munitions, and even fuel for trucks. With inflation stalking the average Russian consumer, Russian companies dealing with double the interest rates we're seeing in the US, partial mobilization draining the labor supply, and even food price inflation outpacing what is seen in the US as well as in most of Europe, Russia's capacity to sustain a foreign adventure such as the invasion of Ukraine is going to be limited at best, and the more the economy contracts the less able it will be to sustain that invasion.
Which is why I have come to believe that NATO's overall strategy vis-a-vis Ukraine is to give the Ukrainians the weapons and the supplies to carry on the fight. Ukraine has no option BUT to fight, because if they stop fighting they cease to exist. Putin's recent missile strikes merely punctuate the ethnonationalist doctrine he made plain in July of 2021, which made it clear that, in his mind, Ukraine exists as a satellite in Muscovite Russian orbit or it does not exist, a binary choice a considerable number of Ukrainians reject (and with many historical reasons, including the Holodomor and Chernobyl).
It's a cynical strategy by NATO, but right now it's proving to be an effective one: NATO supplies the cannons, Ukraine supplies the cannon fodder.
As long as Ukraine has the material, they will supply the manpower, and Russia's manpower and material depth is proving to be considerably less than many might have projected previously--especially given the Russian Army's relatively recent experiences from the Second Chechen War and Syria, which should have demonstrated the importance of sound logistics to the Russian Army command staff.
Will Ukraine ultimately prevail militarily? That's debatable. On paper, this is still Russia's war to lose (although if Kherson does fall that presumption might need to be revisited). But even if Russia prevails militarily over Ukraine, it is increasingly unlikely, particularly given Russia's contracting economy, that Russia will be able to hold on to Ukraine for very long, and while they are trying to do that it is highly unlikely that Russia will be a military threat to anyone else.
Russian battlefield failures in WW1 gave rise to first the February and then the October Revolutions in 1917 that ultimately swept away the Romanov Tsars. Which is an historical precedent that should give Putin pause--there's only so many setbacks he can suffer in Ukraine before his position in the Kremlin is suddenly made vacant.
It is also worth remembering that Tsar Nicholas II started out with a good deal more popular support for Russian involvement in WW1 than Putin has for Ukraine. Nothing saps a people's enthusiasm for war as quickly as repeated defeats.
The longer Putin grinds it out in Ukraine, the worse it gets for the Russians. Putin needs either to persuade NATO to cut bait on the Ukrainians, or he needs a plausible way to declare "mission accomplished" to get the hell out of there.
Of course the Russian citizens are paying. But if it's really a "war of attrition", Russia seems likely to win in the end. 150 million people vs. 40 million people, and a GDP almost an order of magnitude larger.
Will enough Russian citizens tire of it first to change that? Good question. Historically, Russians have a a great deal of resolve when it comes to wars -- just ask Napoleon or Hitler.
Russia does very well against invaders (Napoleon and Hitler).
Russia does very poorly as the invaders (Austerlitz, Tannenburg, First and Second Masurian Lakes, the disastrous offensives of 1917 that ultimately led to mass mutinies within the Russian army).
Being the invaders, Russia's manpower advantages long term largely disappear, and if the news reports of a mass exodus of young Russian men after Putin's partial mobilization announcement are even partly true, there is no manpower advantage in the end. Russia's young men will simply not show up for the fight.
The economic questions are a good deal murkier. Yes, Russia has a larger GDP, but, based on Russia sourcing drones from Iran and Putin's "economic mobilization" orders earlier this week, the Russian economy is not doing a good job of keeping the Russian military supplied with basic resources: bullets, artillery munitions, and even fuel for trucks. With inflation stalking the average Russian consumer, Russian companies dealing with double the interest rates we're seeing in the US, partial mobilization draining the labor supply, and even food price inflation outpacing what is seen in the US as well as in most of Europe, Russia's capacity to sustain a foreign adventure such as the invasion of Ukraine is going to be limited at best, and the more the economy contracts the less able it will be to sustain that invasion.
Which is why I have come to believe that NATO's overall strategy vis-a-vis Ukraine is to give the Ukrainians the weapons and the supplies to carry on the fight. Ukraine has no option BUT to fight, because if they stop fighting they cease to exist. Putin's recent missile strikes merely punctuate the ethnonationalist doctrine he made plain in July of 2021, which made it clear that, in his mind, Ukraine exists as a satellite in Muscovite Russian orbit or it does not exist, a binary choice a considerable number of Ukrainians reject (and with many historical reasons, including the Holodomor and Chernobyl).
It's a cynical strategy by NATO, but right now it's proving to be an effective one: NATO supplies the cannons, Ukraine supplies the cannon fodder.
As long as Ukraine has the material, they will supply the manpower, and Russia's manpower and material depth is proving to be considerably less than many might have projected previously--especially given the Russian Army's relatively recent experiences from the Second Chechen War and Syria, which should have demonstrated the importance of sound logistics to the Russian Army command staff.
Will Ukraine ultimately prevail militarily? That's debatable. On paper, this is still Russia's war to lose (although if Kherson does fall that presumption might need to be revisited). But even if Russia prevails militarily over Ukraine, it is increasingly unlikely, particularly given Russia's contracting economy, that Russia will be able to hold on to Ukraine for very long, and while they are trying to do that it is highly unlikely that Russia will be a military threat to anyone else.
Russian battlefield failures in WW1 gave rise to first the February and then the October Revolutions in 1917 that ultimately swept away the Romanov Tsars. Which is an historical precedent that should give Putin pause--there's only so many setbacks he can suffer in Ukraine before his position in the Kremlin is suddenly made vacant.
It is also worth remembering that Tsar Nicholas II started out with a good deal more popular support for Russian involvement in WW1 than Putin has for Ukraine. Nothing saps a people's enthusiasm for war as quickly as repeated defeats.
The longer Putin grinds it out in Ukraine, the worse it gets for the Russians. Putin needs either to persuade NATO to cut bait on the Ukrainians, or he needs a plausible way to declare "mission accomplished" to get the hell out of there.