Syria: A Week When Years Happened

Will Assad Survive?

“There are decades when nothing happens, and there are weeks when decades happen”

Vladimir Lenin (apocryphal)

The past week has definitely been a week when years at least have happened in Syria. After several years of a rough ceasefire between the forces of Syrian strongman Bashir al-Assad and the Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) rebel group backed by Turkey’s strongman President Recep Erdoğan, the HTS rebels have broken out of Syria’s Idlib province in a shock offensive that has proved suprisingly durable.

With two of Syria’s largest cities already under HTS control, and a third—Homs—coming under attack, the question quickly emerges: can Assad survive this latest rebel push?

Even as of this writing, events are still very much in flux, but already the threat to Assad’s hold on power is real, is growing, and if not stopped may soon become irresistable. While HTS toppling Assad would not itself be the end of civil war in Syria, nor even the beginning of the end of the civil war in Syria, the dismantling of the Assad regime would qualify as the end of the beginning of the civil war in Syria.

When the rebel offensive began on November 27, Assad’s forces were in firm command of Aleppo as well as about 70% of Syria.

Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham held sway in Idlib, supported by the Turkish military. Syria’s Kurdish rebels backed by the United States dominated in northeastern Syria.

At least, that was the illusion that prevailed up until November 27, when HTS forces attacked east from Idlib driving towards Aleppo.

The initial provocation was claimed to be attacks by Syrian and Russian air forces on civilians in southern Idlib. Turkey went so far as to claim it had tried to dissuade HTS from launching the offensive, but to no avail.

A senior Turkish security source told Middle East Eye that Turkey attempted to prevent the offensive to avoid further escalating tensions in the region, especially given Israel's wars on Gaza and Lebanon.

However, efforts to use channels established by a 2019 de-escalation agreement to halt Russian and Syrian government air strikes targeting residential areas of rebel-held Idlib province had not yielded results.

“In response to these attacks, Syrian opposition groups launched a limited operation towards Aleppo, targeting the areas from which the attacks originated,” the source said.

Despite those assurances of a “limited” offensive operation, HTS forces quickly closed in on Aleppo, and were largely in control of the city by November 30, when the rebels occupied Aleppo’s international airport.

However, rebels led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and allied groups, including some backed by Turkey, claimed stunning gains on Saturday.

They claimed to have seized Aleppo International Airport and the strategic city of Khan Sheikhoun in southern Idlib.

At the same time, the rebels had begun driving south towards Hama, Syria’s third largest city, with the result that HTS had seized at least temporary control over a surprising amount of Syrian territory in between Aleppo and Hama.

By December 4, Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham was starting to encircle Hama, making their occupation of the city almost inevitable.

At the same time, HTS spokesmen were making promises of safety and security towards the civilian population in Hama, as well as trumpeting the groups rapid advances. By this point is was quite apparent that, despite Turkey’s earlier assurances, this offensive was anything but limited.

Perhaps the most telling aspect of the advance by this point was a lack of effective response or even counterattack by either Syrian or Russian forces. There were reports of aerial assaults on Idlib city, but as of this writing there has been no reporting of a concerted effort to halt the HTS drive south. Indeed, Assad’s forces appear to be more or less in full retreat.

As the day progressed, so did HTS, advancing on multiple objectives in the vicinity of Hama, successfully severing roads and lines of communication to Assad’s forces.

What makes this progress particularly important is that the only major city between Hamas and the Syrian capital of Damascus is Homs.

With those two cities in rebel hands, there are not a lot of places on the highway to Damascus where Assad’s forces could mount either a counterattack or a defensive stand.

Earlier today (December 5), Hama fell to the rebels, with Assad’s forces pulling out of the city. In a noteworthy turn of events indicating the degree to which Assad’s regime is losing control of the situation, the Syrian Army publicly acknowledged it was surrendering Hama.

Even as Hama fell, Homs was already starting to come under shelling by rebel forces.

Recognizing the seriousness of the situation—although perhaps not fully appreciating its urgency—the Syrian, Iranian, and Iraqi foreign ministers announced they would be meeting in Baghdad on Friday, December 6, to discuss the rapidly evolving situation.

As of the time of that announcement there still had not been any significant counterattack or defensive effort either by Iranian, Syrian, or Russian forces of sufficient strength to halt the rebel advances. With the Syrian Army constantly retreating from the HTS rebels, by the time the ministers meet in Baghdad, it may very well be that the situation in Syria is beyond salvage.

Adding to Assad’s woes, the Free Houran rebel group took advantage of the fall of Hama in the north to rise up in the south. They made their presence known first by seizing a military checkpoint near Ghabagheb on the highway between Damascus and Daraa.

Shortly after they issued a call for regime forces in the area to defect to them, offering assurances of safety to any forces who did so.

Despite—or perhaps because of—the rebel successes, Kremlin spokesman Dimitry Peskov reiterated Russia’s support for the Assad regime, including ongoing military support.

“We are in constant dialogue with our Syrian friends in Damascus. Depending on the assessment of the situation, the amount of assistance can be decided that the Syrian authorities would need to deal with the militants and eliminate this threat,” Peskov told journalists during a regular briefing.

The Russian military previously reported delivering strikes on positions held by HTS and its allies, with hundreds of casualties reportedly inflicted.

However, with the bulk of the Russian military tied up in Ukraine and the lack of success by the Russian air force at stopping the rebel advances with aerial bombardments, the question emerges whether Russia is going to be able to provide the necessary support in time to preserve the Assad regime.

Several of these events have unfolded even as I have been putting this article together. That is how fast things are moving on the ground in Syria.

In the space of eight days, Syrian rebels have captured two of Syria’s largest cities and are on the verge of capturing a third. Emboldened by the success of Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham in the north, other rebel groups in the northwest as well as the south of the country are rising up and engaging the Syrian Army, apparently with effect.

While the Syrian Army appears to be retreating before the HTS advance in relatively good order—at least to the extent that there have not been any reports of Syrian soldiers abandoning equipment in a headlong route—thus far they have not managed to put up even a determined resistance. The rebels have been overcoming them at virtually every stage of this offensive, without any setbacks being reported.

Will the Syrian Army be able to check the rebel advance before it reaches Damascus, and thus preserve the Assad regime? While that might be a normal expectation in most civil wars, at present that is becoming increasingly unlikely in Syria.

Should Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham succeed in capturing Homs in the next couple of days, where would the Syrian Army establish a firm defensive line to halt the advance on Damascus? There are no major cities between Homs and Damascus, and the road network into the center and west of the country is sparse and does not provide an abundance of opportunities for a Syrian counterattack along the highway between Homs and Damascus.

In theory, either the Russian or Syrian air force could attack various points along that highway to either slow the rebel advance or neutralize their established positions. However, in theory they have that capacity now, but in reality that have not succeeded in doing so. The longer this unfolds without such aerial interdiction taking place, the less likely it will be that either air force truly does have this capacity.

In that scenario, can Assad retain power? That seems unlikely.

Should the Assad regime fall, that will be a major loss of credibility to his two principal backers, Russia and Iran. If Assad’s regime should fall in the next few days or even weeks—a scenario which is not at all outside the realm of possibility given events to date—the capacity of both Russia and Iran to project power in the Middle East will be seriously reduced. In Russia’s case that capacity would be virtually eliminated.

At the same time, the toppling of the Assad regime would be a clear victory for the Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham rebels and their sponsor, Turkey. While there are a number of other rebel groups who will no doubt contest control over Syria with HTS—most notably the Kurds in the northwest near both Turkey and Iraq—Turkey will be the dominant international player in the region.

The loss of the Assad regime—and most importantly the loss of control by the Assad regime over southern Syria—would greatly reduce Iran’s ability to support the Hezbollah milita in Lebanon in its war with Israel. Hezbollah has already suffered major setbacks and casualties at the hands of the Israeli Defense Force; if Iran cannot provide them with logisitical support their position vis-a-vis Israel becomes even more parlous and untenable.

One week of fighting—perhaps two—and the entire balance of power in the Middle East may be permanently shifted. Iran could be greatly reduced in stature, Turkey could be greatly elevated in stature, and Israel could find itself very much in control over its own destiny in the region.

The collapse of the Assad regime will not bring peace to the Middle East. It may even provoke a more prolonged conflict, as various rebel factions battle each other for ultimate control over Syria. But the collapse of the Assad regime will permanently alter the dynamics for all the countries in the region.

That would make this past week one where several years happened, at the very least.