As usual, a very intelligent and level-headed assessment, Peter. And I agree: the removal of financial sanctions is a big problem. My bet is that as soon as certain IRGC players have that $25 billion in their personal pockets they will go right back to terrorizing the MidEast. Color me the brightest hue of skeptical.
Timing is the devil in the details we do not have.
We have to recognize that any deal whereby Iran gives up its nuclear weapons program will involve sanctions relief and the return of frozen assets. That has always been intrinsic to any negotiations with Iran over its nuclear weapons program.
Iran is pushing for immediate releases of funds, and the US is saying "No".
Releasing funds after downblending is at least started would be reasonable. Releasing funds before Iran has actually done anything would not.
"We Have A Deal But No Details", more aptly put would be "We Don't Have A Deal Because There Are No Details". A “memorandum of understanding” is really not a deal, as many have pointed out. The U.S is still basically back to square one on the nuclear issue and that is if it's really an issue or not, ( after 40 some years of hearing about this, it makes one wonder quite honestly) and the Iranians get some frozen cash back. Not much of a deal if you ask me, By tomorrow, it will probably all change anyway!!!
A MOU is certainly not a final negotiated resolution of Iran's nuclear weapons program.
The significance of the "deal" is that it reopens the Strait of Hormuz and allows Persian Gulf oil to flow once more, including Iranian oil. That is the only question the MOU itself resolves.
The teaser in the MOU is the apparent concession by Iran to downblending its stockpile of enriched uranium. If the US is able to monitor the downblending, that's no small concession, because that process eliminates 460kg of 60% enriched uranium as well as the stockpile of 20% enriched uranium, reducing the enrichment level presumably to the civilian level of 3%-5%.
Even if no other concession were made by Iran, without that stockpile of 60% enriched uranium Iran does not have "breakout" capacity to quickly enrich uranium to the 90%+ level needed for nuclear weapons production. Given Iran's native ballistic missile technologies, the moment Iran comes into possession of even a few kilograms of 90%+ enriched uranium is the moment Iran possesses viable nuclear weapons.
Without the existing stockpile of enriched uranium, Iran has to restart the enrichment process, which would push the time frame for Iran to reach that 90%+ threshold from a few months to a couple of years.
Obviously, downblending alone is not a resolution of Iran's nuclear weapons program, but if Iran is willing to surrender that leverage while simultaneously relinquishing leverage on the Strait of Hormuz, their bargaining position on their overall nuclear weapons program is significantly diminished. If Obama had secured a verifiable downblending agreement in the JCPOA that agreement might have had a much different reception.
If the MOU secures the reopening of the Strait while strengthening the US negotiating posture on Iran's overall nuclear weapons program, then it contains significant geopolitical wins for President Trump and the US. Going by the points reported by Reuters, the principal geopolitical win for Iran is the release of the $25 billion in frozen assets.
Of course, at this point the key word in all of this remains "if".
As usual, a very intelligent and level-headed assessment, Peter. And I agree: the removal of financial sanctions is a big problem. My bet is that as soon as certain IRGC players have that $25 billion in their personal pockets they will go right back to terrorizing the MidEast. Color me the brightest hue of skeptical.
Timing is the devil in the details we do not have.
We have to recognize that any deal whereby Iran gives up its nuclear weapons program will involve sanctions relief and the return of frozen assets. That has always been intrinsic to any negotiations with Iran over its nuclear weapons program.
Iran is pushing for immediate releases of funds, and the US is saying "No".
Releasing funds after downblending is at least started would be reasonable. Releasing funds before Iran has actually done anything would not.
Yes! Fortunately, Trump is NOT a gullible, naive fool.
"We Have A Deal But No Details", more aptly put would be "We Don't Have A Deal Because There Are No Details". A “memorandum of understanding” is really not a deal, as many have pointed out. The U.S is still basically back to square one on the nuclear issue and that is if it's really an issue or not, ( after 40 some years of hearing about this, it makes one wonder quite honestly) and the Iranians get some frozen cash back. Not much of a deal if you ask me, By tomorrow, it will probably all change anyway!!!
A MOU is certainly not a final negotiated resolution of Iran's nuclear weapons program.
The significance of the "deal" is that it reopens the Strait of Hormuz and allows Persian Gulf oil to flow once more, including Iranian oil. That is the only question the MOU itself resolves.
The teaser in the MOU is the apparent concession by Iran to downblending its stockpile of enriched uranium. If the US is able to monitor the downblending, that's no small concession, because that process eliminates 460kg of 60% enriched uranium as well as the stockpile of 20% enriched uranium, reducing the enrichment level presumably to the civilian level of 3%-5%.
Even if no other concession were made by Iran, without that stockpile of 60% enriched uranium Iran does not have "breakout" capacity to quickly enrich uranium to the 90%+ level needed for nuclear weapons production. Given Iran's native ballistic missile technologies, the moment Iran comes into possession of even a few kilograms of 90%+ enriched uranium is the moment Iran possesses viable nuclear weapons.
Without the existing stockpile of enriched uranium, Iran has to restart the enrichment process, which would push the time frame for Iran to reach that 90%+ threshold from a few months to a couple of years.
Obviously, downblending alone is not a resolution of Iran's nuclear weapons program, but if Iran is willing to surrender that leverage while simultaneously relinquishing leverage on the Strait of Hormuz, their bargaining position on their overall nuclear weapons program is significantly diminished. If Obama had secured a verifiable downblending agreement in the JCPOA that agreement might have had a much different reception.
If the MOU secures the reopening of the Strait while strengthening the US negotiating posture on Iran's overall nuclear weapons program, then it contains significant geopolitical wins for President Trump and the US. Going by the points reported by Reuters, the principal geopolitical win for Iran is the release of the $25 billion in frozen assets.
Of course, at this point the key word in all of this remains "if".
Good points as usual.
🙏 I hope it sticks.
I hope there’s enough of a deal there to make having it stick worthwhile. We won’t know that until the official text is made public.