Regardless of how events on the battlefield ultimately unfold, one reality seems unavoidable: Russian business—in this instance, the Moscow Stock Exchange—is showing precious little confidence in Putin’s strategy. Ever since the beginning of the war the index has trended lower and lower; if investors believed the war would end well for Russia and Russian business the index would be moving higher on a sustainable basis.
Even if Russian forces ultimately prevail in Ukraine (a likely outcome in a war of attrition, simply because Russia can throw more men and material into the meatgrinder of battle), the costs and consequences of that war could easily turn the military victory into a Pyrrhic one, leaving Russia’s economy devastated and collapsing.
As I recall, the Russian Army used Russia’s natural depth and naturally harsh winter to demolish La Grande Armee. While Borodino was a bloody battle, the casualties were high on both sides.
Still, technically Napoleon won the battle, and had the Russians not burned Moscow, leaving him no chance to winter there, the outcome of the Russian campaign would have ended very differently.
Against the Wermacht, many of the same tactics were used, particularly in flipping the occupation of Stalingrad into the largest trap in military history. However, you are correct that a frequent criticism of Marshal Zhukov was that he was rather indifferent to Russian casualties, and the quality of Russian training contributed to some very high casualty rates.
However, there are some military theorists who believe that had Hitler not invested so much at Stalingrad, the outcome on the Russian front could have been different. That's a bit of a reach, in my view, because the Wermacht never had the logistics and the resources to sustain major military operations so far afield.
Russia’s basic tactical doctrine, from all that I have read, is basically make the invader pay for every inch of Russian soil, casualties be damned.
As a defensive doctrine, it works. Russia’s problem is that they are the invader, not the invaded. And Russian invasions of Europe have always gone very badly, from Austerlitz to Tannerburg to their disastrous 1917 offensive.
NATO, perhaps. Ukraine seems pretty highly motivated to make Russia bleed. And if the casualty estimates we're seeing are even halfway correct (and the one thing that is certain is that the Russian assertions of low casualties and 95% of wounded being returned to the front lines are pure horse hockey--if that were true there'd be no need for 300,000 conscripts), Russia is doing a fair bit of bleeding in Ukraine.
NATO's strategy in Ukraine is cynical but frankly effective. NATO provides the hardware, Ukraine provides the cannon fodder. Even if Russia ultimately wins their army will be in no shape to fight anywhere else, and their economic isolation will by that point be more or less permanent. (And if you look at a map of Russian pipelines, if they can't sell oil and gas to Europe or transit through tanker terminals in the Baltic, they don't sell much oil or gas).
NATO weapons are outperforming Russian weapons, Ukrainian troops are more motivated (and some analysts argue better trained, but that might be a problematic conclusion), and if NATO and the EU hold together through the winter, Russia's energy advantage evaporates faster than the gas bubbling up from the Nordstream pipelines.
Russia's disastrous WW1 campaigns against Germany helped end the Romanov dynasty. Stalin became "Uncle Joe" because it was all about defending Mother Russia (never mind that Russia helped kickstart WW2 with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939).
Putin may think he's a strongman in the Stalin mold, but history is making him look more like Nicholas II--and that's not a good comparison for his physical health going forward.
Do you think their aligning with the BRICS will succeed or backfire? I imagine that's why they made those moves in order to soften any retaliatory blows from the West.
BRICS has actually been a growing organization for 14 years--growing in size, but not really in influence.
Russia's problem vis-a-vis BRICS is that the two principal players are Russia and China. Both nations are dealing with contracting (some might even argue collapsing) economies--and Brazil and South Africa are not far behind, with only India showing any signs of economic life. That pretty much makes the BRICS group of nations a collection of cripples looking to walk with just two crutches by leaning on each other and hoping no one falls down.
That's the economic problem--there's no wellspring of prosperity to draw upon, and certainly the Belt and Road Initiative is no Marshall Plan.
The political problem is that Russia and China have NEVER been natural allies. People tend to forget that Russia was very much a part of the foreign nations foisting the "Unequal Treaties" on the Manchu Qing Dynasty at the end of the 19th century (and when Japan invaded Manchuria in the 1930s they spent a fair amount of fighting Russia rather than China, which is how Zhukov earned his place atop the Russian military after battles like Khalkhin Gol). China's antipathy towards the West in general is not merely a Maoist Communist ideological construct, but a reaction to the national humiliation the Chinese people experienced at the end of the 19th century--and Russia is a part of that humiliation.
Which is why it did not take long for Mao to have a falling out with Russia after the Communist takeover in 1949. While the big split happened in the 1960s, that was the culmination of a lot of lesser annoyances Mao had against Russia--because there never was any real love lost between Mao and Russia (the Bolsheviks gave him an education and helped the Chinese Communist Party get organized, but it was never more than an alliance of convenience).
The EU has been growing and evolving since the 1950s, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since the late 1940s. One can argue how well or productive those evolutions have been, but what is undeniable is that they have been substantive, influential, and impactful. BRICS has nowhere near the substance, influence, or impact as of yet (even Russian media admits that China is reluctant to invest in or export goods to Russian markets), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (sort of an Eurasian counterweight to NATO) has yet to develop the coordinated command and control structures necessary for effective joint military engagements. The countries make a big show of holding "joint" exercises, but without coordinated command and control structures among the member nations those exercises are not terribly useful. To grasp the difference between the SCO and NATO one only has to look at their organizational structures
In terms of maturity of military organization in particular the SCO has a long way to go to catch up to NATO. That dilutes any effectiveness the organization might have on joint military operations.
Into the relative immaturity that is BRICS comes Putin's war with Ukraine. Even India has basically told Putin to search for peace, China is trying to sound statesmanlike by arguing for peace, and Turkey for its part is turning off Russian Mir cards. BRICS as an organization was not ready for Putin's war, with the possible exception of China was not consulted about Putin's war, and has no real commitment or obligation to Russia as a result of Putin's war. The same holds true for the SCO.
Which makes Putin's war a problem for BRICS; it does not make BRICS a solution for Putin's war.
Interesting.
Isn't that what they did against La Grande Armee and the Nazis? That is. throw men at the problem?
I could be wrong, but my impression from reading Russian history and literature, is producing great strategic Generals isn't a strong suit.
As I recall, the Russian Army used Russia’s natural depth and naturally harsh winter to demolish La Grande Armee. While Borodino was a bloody battle, the casualties were high on both sides.
Still, technically Napoleon won the battle, and had the Russians not burned Moscow, leaving him no chance to winter there, the outcome of the Russian campaign would have ended very differently.
Against the Wermacht, many of the same tactics were used, particularly in flipping the occupation of Stalingrad into the largest trap in military history. However, you are correct that a frequent criticism of Marshal Zhukov was that he was rather indifferent to Russian casualties, and the quality of Russian training contributed to some very high casualty rates.
However, there are some military theorists who believe that had Hitler not invested so much at Stalingrad, the outcome on the Russian front could have been different. That's a bit of a reach, in my view, because the Wermacht never had the logistics and the resources to sustain major military operations so far afield.
Russia’s basic tactical doctrine, from all that I have read, is basically make the invader pay for every inch of Russian soil, casualties be damned.
As a defensive doctrine, it works. Russia’s problem is that they are the invader, not the invaded. And Russian invasions of Europe have always gone very badly, from Austerlitz to Tannerburg to their disastrous 1917 offensive.
Yes, they simply froze the French to death. The Russians have in their history the tolerance for wars of attrition - or trench warfare.
This war we're witnessing will be determined by who wants it more. Russia is more than willing to fight to its end because of this. The West less so.
NATO, perhaps. Ukraine seems pretty highly motivated to make Russia bleed. And if the casualty estimates we're seeing are even halfway correct (and the one thing that is certain is that the Russian assertions of low casualties and 95% of wounded being returned to the front lines are pure horse hockey--if that were true there'd be no need for 300,000 conscripts), Russia is doing a fair bit of bleeding in Ukraine.
NATO's strategy in Ukraine is cynical but frankly effective. NATO provides the hardware, Ukraine provides the cannon fodder. Even if Russia ultimately wins their army will be in no shape to fight anywhere else, and their economic isolation will by that point be more or less permanent. (And if you look at a map of Russian pipelines, if they can't sell oil and gas to Europe or transit through tanker terminals in the Baltic, they don't sell much oil or gas).
NATO weapons are outperforming Russian weapons, Ukrainian troops are more motivated (and some analysts argue better trained, but that might be a problematic conclusion), and if NATO and the EU hold together through the winter, Russia's energy advantage evaporates faster than the gas bubbling up from the Nordstream pipelines.
Russia's disastrous WW1 campaigns against Germany helped end the Romanov dynasty. Stalin became "Uncle Joe" because it was all about defending Mother Russia (never mind that Russia helped kickstart WW2 with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939).
Putin may think he's a strongman in the Stalin mold, but history is making him look more like Nicholas II--and that's not a good comparison for his physical health going forward.
Do you think their aligning with the BRICS will succeed or backfire? I imagine that's why they made those moves in order to soften any retaliatory blows from the West.
Great analysis!
BRICS has actually been a growing organization for 14 years--growing in size, but not really in influence.
Russia's problem vis-a-vis BRICS is that the two principal players are Russia and China. Both nations are dealing with contracting (some might even argue collapsing) economies--and Brazil and South Africa are not far behind, with only India showing any signs of economic life. That pretty much makes the BRICS group of nations a collection of cripples looking to walk with just two crutches by leaning on each other and hoping no one falls down.
That's the economic problem--there's no wellspring of prosperity to draw upon, and certainly the Belt and Road Initiative is no Marshall Plan.
The political problem is that Russia and China have NEVER been natural allies. People tend to forget that Russia was very much a part of the foreign nations foisting the "Unequal Treaties" on the Manchu Qing Dynasty at the end of the 19th century (and when Japan invaded Manchuria in the 1930s they spent a fair amount of fighting Russia rather than China, which is how Zhukov earned his place atop the Russian military after battles like Khalkhin Gol). China's antipathy towards the West in general is not merely a Maoist Communist ideological construct, but a reaction to the national humiliation the Chinese people experienced at the end of the 19th century--and Russia is a part of that humiliation.
https://ehne.fr/en/encyclopedia/themes/europe-europeans-and-world/europe-and-legal-regulation-international-relations/unequal-treaties-china
Which is why it did not take long for Mao to have a falling out with Russia after the Communist takeover in 1949. While the big split happened in the 1960s, that was the culmination of a lot of lesser annoyances Mao had against Russia--because there never was any real love lost between Mao and Russia (the Bolsheviks gave him an education and helped the Chinese Communist Party get organized, but it was never more than an alliance of convenience).
The EU has been growing and evolving since the 1950s, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since the late 1940s. One can argue how well or productive those evolutions have been, but what is undeniable is that they have been substantive, influential, and impactful. BRICS has nowhere near the substance, influence, or impact as of yet (even Russian media admits that China is reluctant to invest in or export goods to Russian markets), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (sort of an Eurasian counterweight to NATO) has yet to develop the coordinated command and control structures necessary for effective joint military engagements. The countries make a big show of holding "joint" exercises, but without coordinated command and control structures among the member nations those exercises are not terribly useful. To grasp the difference between the SCO and NATO one only has to look at their organizational structures
SCO:
http://eng.sectsco.org/secretariat/
NATO:
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/structure.htm
In terms of maturity of military organization in particular the SCO has a long way to go to catch up to NATO. That dilutes any effectiveness the organization might have on joint military operations.
Into the relative immaturity that is BRICS comes Putin's war with Ukraine. Even India has basically told Putin to search for peace, China is trying to sound statesmanlike by arguing for peace, and Turkey for its part is turning off Russian Mir cards. BRICS as an organization was not ready for Putin's war, with the possible exception of China was not consulted about Putin's war, and has no real commitment or obligation to Russia as a result of Putin's war. The same holds true for the SCO.
Which makes Putin's war a problem for BRICS; it does not make BRICS a solution for Putin's war.
Yes, China never accepted being forced into an open-door policy n by the West.
The BRICS seems like a half-hearted attempt at challenging American hegemony.
Thanks for this.