Simplicity is at the heart of every good deception. In WW2, the Allies distracted Hitler from the true target of the D-Day landings by converting the real First United States Army Group (at the time commanded by Omar Bradley and never more than a skeletal administrative structure that had never received actual operational forc…
Simplicity is at the heart of every good deception. In WW2, the Allies distracted Hitler from the true target of the D-Day landings by converting the real First United States Army Group (at the time commanded by Omar Bradley and never more than a skeletal administrative structure that had never received actual operational forces) into a fictitious army group which was then placed under Patton.
On the battlefield, a "quaker gun"--a tree made to look like an actual cannon--was an effective tool of deception during the 18th and 19th century.
Russia could have accomplished all of the same deception goals without roiling the interior of Russia by having Prigozhin suffer a "heart attack"--and then surreptitiously going to Minsk to organize a Wagner invasion force, which would be built up by rotating Wagner forces slowly from their field camps in the rear. By August or September Prigozhin would have a suitable force to make a blitz attack on Kyiv.
Even without deception, it would take until at least August to assemble an invasion force in Belarus to strike at Kyiv with enough supplies and gasoline to get there.
Instead of pulling attention away from Wagner Group, what's unfolding now archives, this does the polar opposite.
Not really.
Simplicity is at the heart of every good deception. In WW2, the Allies distracted Hitler from the true target of the D-Day landings by converting the real First United States Army Group (at the time commanded by Omar Bradley and never more than a skeletal administrative structure that had never received actual operational forces) into a fictitious army group which was then placed under Patton.
On the battlefield, a "quaker gun"--a tree made to look like an actual cannon--was an effective tool of deception during the 18th and 19th century.
Russia could have accomplished all of the same deception goals without roiling the interior of Russia by having Prigozhin suffer a "heart attack"--and then surreptitiously going to Minsk to organize a Wagner invasion force, which would be built up by rotating Wagner forces slowly from their field camps in the rear. By August or September Prigozhin would have a suitable force to make a blitz attack on Kyiv.
Even without deception, it would take until at least August to assemble an invasion force in Belarus to strike at Kyiv with enough supplies and gasoline to get there.
Instead of pulling attention away from Wagner Group, what's unfolding now archives, this does the polar opposite.