I asked for input on your Substack on theduran.local.com and all I got was this reply, so you seem to be correct on facts even if you are missing the facts on economics in the west, and now Ukraine is dark - All facts matter!
Evil Russian Imperialist@Russ_Imperialist wrote (So take all of this with a grain of Iranian drones):
to> @HenrikWallin "For one the pearls ar too small, while for another the soup is too thin".
As the army would never be too ready for upcoming war (you can be even more ready, no matter how long you prepare), so the already fighting regiments can always be better supplied. Basic needs are met for the absolute most of the troops. Can they be better supplied? Sure. Is it meaningful, or does it only postpone the start of operations? Every case is unique, and it can't be generalized.
While I never claim to have "all" the facts, if you have read my Substack you are already aware that I have outlined the many risks and even existential threats facing the European economy.
While the situation is still unfolding on both sides, and thus any assessment quickly becomes dated shortly after it is issued, I am confident that I have not been naive about the situation facing Europe as this war progresses.
But the Russian media has repeatedly highlighted Russian industry's difficulties in meeting the need for crucial supplies both for the front-line forces in Ukraine and the newly mobilized troops.
It is Russian sources speaking to Russian media that gives the estimate that Russian industry needs a year to put itself on a proper war footing to supply Russian troops adequately--one year from roughly a month ago, not from the start of the war in February.
It is Russian sources that detail the difficulties Russia's front line troops have been having in stopping Ukrainian offensives.
RUSSIA is saying these things. Not western intelligence. Not the UK Ministry of Defence. Not MI6. Not any military-oriented "think tank" here in the US. Russia.
The overall situation is very much exactly as I have framed it: an economic war of attrition between the EU and Russia, and right now it is very much up in the air which side can outlast the other--and what shape that side's economy will be when the other finally falters.
While in various articles I have focused on either Europe's economic situation or Russia's economic/logistical situation, overall I am confident I have been balanced in my analysis, nor am I relying Western media for any assessments of Russia's situation. The economic metrics I cite come from Trading Economics, which compiles them from Rostat (Russia's official statistics agency). Normally I would go straight to Rostat's own web sites, but open access to those pages early on proved to be a hit-or-miss proposition. Trading Economics provides a more consistently accessible data stream for the economic picture (and I have sourced enough items from them and vetted them with other sources to have a high degree of confidence in their accuracy).
However, the question is not whether Russia is "too ready", or whether there is always benefit to obtaining greater resources. The sentiments that have been conveyed by Putin on down indicate that Russian forces are not being adequately supplied even now. That there are difficulties getting basic kits together for mobilized troops, and that the costs of small arms munitions have skyrocketed since the war's onset--a telltale sign of shortage. Russia's manufacturing base has been contracting, not expanding--and a robust delivery of war materiel would produce the exact opposite effect as a matter of basic economics of supply and demand.
I do not speculate on the precise magnitude of the supply challenges. Russian sources do not make that data readily accessible (at least, I haven't found a reliable source yet that would support such analyses). However, the fact that Putin established a new ad hoc commission to accelerate Russian industry's conversion to a war footing, the fact that Russia's arms darling Kalashnikov has been tasked with taking lead in collating the data showing Russian industry's progress in that effort, and the fact that Putin even now says publicly that Russian industry needs to step up where the supply situation is concerned all speak to a supply situation that not only is not ideal, but is generating enough concern both within the Kremlin and among the Russian people that Putin--not one known for being concerned about public opinion--felt compelled to speak to and address those concerns. That makes the supply situation "not small".
Is it lethal to Russia's war effort? The data has not been developed that supports that conclusion, and I have not claimed that the supply situation is lethal. But if Russia's supply challenges persist and Ukraine continues to enjoy logistical support from NATO, this greatly shifts the probabilities of victory both tactically and strategically from Russia to Ukraine.
I've done resource and capacity planning for thirty years. I've lived and breathed the military truisim that "professionals talk logistics". The facts and the data that I have presented in this Substack amply document Russia's broad logistical challenges.
If you believe my data is in error, I enthusiastically encourage you to point out where and how. Nothing but knowledge can ever come from a robust debate grounded in facts.
Frankly, if the only response you got was some presumably Russian proverb involving pearls and soup, perhaps you should ask yourself why there were no facts rebutting my assessments. That type of response reminds me of a business continuity crisis I was called in to manage at a petrochemical company once--the IT manager was reluctant to entertain my worst case scenario, stating to the effect that he had to believe that the situation was not that bad. My response to him was simply "belief is fine in church on Sunday. It has no bearing on business continuity response". Which I trust establishes my take on that proverb as regards Russia's supply and logistics situation in Ukraine.
How "well" the Russian front-line troops are is a topic of some debate. There are numerous stories, mostly anecdotal and difficult to verify, that suggest Russian soldiers are not at all "well".
Even so, there is a qualitative difference between being "well" and being effective. In order to launch any form of offensive, forces need to be well provisioned and well equipped. As it stands Russia's troops have been forced into a largely defensive posture, and without adequate supply lines, they are not going to be able to change that.
If anything we learn from history is that Russia is good at fighting in the winter. Look at Napoleon and Hitler loss against Russia during the winter in the olden days.
Russian military history is complex. While they have been successful at using winter as a defensive force multiplier, they have also never launched a successful invasion of Europe in warfare's modern era (Austerlitz, Tannenburg, First and Second Masurian Lakes, the Brusilov Offensive).
Even with Napoleon the Russians never mounted an actual offense against the French, but conducted harassing attacks as Napoleon retreated. Similarly, they didn't go immediately onto offense after Stalingrad. Germany's ultimate collapse wouldn't come until after the epic tank battle around Kursk.
Russians are rightly highly regarded for the determination with which they defend the motherland. However, their track record as an invading conquering force is far more problematic and uncertain.
I asked for input on your Substack on theduran.local.com and all I got was this reply, so you seem to be correct on facts even if you are missing the facts on economics in the west, and now Ukraine is dark - All facts matter!
Evil Russian Imperialist@Russ_Imperialist wrote (So take all of this with a grain of Iranian drones):
to> @HenrikWallin "For one the pearls ar too small, while for another the soup is too thin".
As the army would never be too ready for upcoming war (you can be even more ready, no matter how long you prepare), so the already fighting regiments can always be better supplied. Basic needs are met for the absolute most of the troops. Can they be better supplied? Sure. Is it meaningful, or does it only postpone the start of operations? Every case is unique, and it can't be generalized.
While I never claim to have "all" the facts, if you have read my Substack you are already aware that I have outlined the many risks and even existential threats facing the European economy.
https://newsletter.allfactsmatter.us/p/russia-vs-europe-who-will-win
https://newsletter.allfactsmatter.us/p/europes-odd-energy-non-crisis
https://newsletter.allfactsmatter.us/p/the-energy-crisis-is-a-crisis-of
While the situation is still unfolding on both sides, and thus any assessment quickly becomes dated shortly after it is issued, I am confident that I have not been naive about the situation facing Europe as this war progresses.
But the Russian media has repeatedly highlighted Russian industry's difficulties in meeting the need for crucial supplies both for the front-line forces in Ukraine and the newly mobilized troops.
https://newsletter.allfactsmatter.us/p/can-kalashnikov-fix-the-russian-armys
https://newsletter.allfactsmatter.us/p/russias-mobilization-combat-capable
https://newsletter.allfactsmatter.us/p/how-can-collapsing-industrial-production
It is Russian sources speaking to Russian media that gives the estimate that Russian industry needs a year to put itself on a proper war footing to supply Russian troops adequately--one year from roughly a month ago, not from the start of the war in February.
It is Russian sources that detail the difficulties Russia's front line troops have been having in stopping Ukrainian offensives.
https://newsletter.allfactsmatter.us/p/putins-costly-war
It was Russia's top general in Ukraine that said the retreat from Kherson City was because Russia could not adequately supply its forces in Kherson.
https://newsletter.allfactsmatter.us/p/russia-pulls-out-of-kherson-to-defend
RUSSIA is saying these things. Not western intelligence. Not the UK Ministry of Defence. Not MI6. Not any military-oriented "think tank" here in the US. Russia.
The overall situation is very much exactly as I have framed it: an economic war of attrition between the EU and Russia, and right now it is very much up in the air which side can outlast the other--and what shape that side's economy will be when the other finally falters.
https://newsletter.allfactsmatter.us/p/russia-vs-europe-who-will-win
While in various articles I have focused on either Europe's economic situation or Russia's economic/logistical situation, overall I am confident I have been balanced in my analysis, nor am I relying Western media for any assessments of Russia's situation. The economic metrics I cite come from Trading Economics, which compiles them from Rostat (Russia's official statistics agency). Normally I would go straight to Rostat's own web sites, but open access to those pages early on proved to be a hit-or-miss proposition. Trading Economics provides a more consistently accessible data stream for the economic picture (and I have sourced enough items from them and vetted them with other sources to have a high degree of confidence in their accuracy).
However, the question is not whether Russia is "too ready", or whether there is always benefit to obtaining greater resources. The sentiments that have been conveyed by Putin on down indicate that Russian forces are not being adequately supplied even now. That there are difficulties getting basic kits together for mobilized troops, and that the costs of small arms munitions have skyrocketed since the war's onset--a telltale sign of shortage. Russia's manufacturing base has been contracting, not expanding--and a robust delivery of war materiel would produce the exact opposite effect as a matter of basic economics of supply and demand.
I do not speculate on the precise magnitude of the supply challenges. Russian sources do not make that data readily accessible (at least, I haven't found a reliable source yet that would support such analyses). However, the fact that Putin established a new ad hoc commission to accelerate Russian industry's conversion to a war footing, the fact that Russia's arms darling Kalashnikov has been tasked with taking lead in collating the data showing Russian industry's progress in that effort, and the fact that Putin even now says publicly that Russian industry needs to step up where the supply situation is concerned all speak to a supply situation that not only is not ideal, but is generating enough concern both within the Kremlin and among the Russian people that Putin--not one known for being concerned about public opinion--felt compelled to speak to and address those concerns. That makes the supply situation "not small".
Is it lethal to Russia's war effort? The data has not been developed that supports that conclusion, and I have not claimed that the supply situation is lethal. But if Russia's supply challenges persist and Ukraine continues to enjoy logistical support from NATO, this greatly shifts the probabilities of victory both tactically and strategically from Russia to Ukraine.
I've done resource and capacity planning for thirty years. I've lived and breathed the military truisim that "professionals talk logistics". The facts and the data that I have presented in this Substack amply document Russia's broad logistical challenges.
If you believe my data is in error, I enthusiastically encourage you to point out where and how. Nothing but knowledge can ever come from a robust debate grounded in facts.
Frankly, if the only response you got was some presumably Russian proverb involving pearls and soup, perhaps you should ask yourself why there were no facts rebutting my assessments. That type of response reminds me of a business continuity crisis I was called in to manage at a petrochemical company once--the IT manager was reluctant to entertain my worst case scenario, stating to the effect that he had to believe that the situation was not that bad. My response to him was simply "belief is fine in church on Sunday. It has no bearing on business continuity response". Which I trust establishes my take on that proverb as regards Russia's supply and logistics situation in Ukraine.
How "well" the Russian front-line troops are is a topic of some debate. There are numerous stories, mostly anecdotal and difficult to verify, that suggest Russian soldiers are not at all "well".
Even so, there is a qualitative difference between being "well" and being effective. In order to launch any form of offensive, forces need to be well provisioned and well equipped. As it stands Russia's troops have been forced into a largely defensive posture, and without adequate supply lines, they are not going to be able to change that.
If anything we learn from history is that Russia is good at fighting in the winter. Look at Napoleon and Hitler loss against Russia during the winter in the olden days.
Russian military history is complex. While they have been successful at using winter as a defensive force multiplier, they have also never launched a successful invasion of Europe in warfare's modern era (Austerlitz, Tannenburg, First and Second Masurian Lakes, the Brusilov Offensive).
Even with Napoleon the Russians never mounted an actual offense against the French, but conducted harassing attacks as Napoleon retreated. Similarly, they didn't go immediately onto offense after Stalingrad. Germany's ultimate collapse wouldn't come until after the epic tank battle around Kursk.
Russians are rightly highly regarded for the determination with which they defend the motherland. However, their track record as an invading conquering force is far more problematic and uncertain.
Right now, Ukraine is winning on the battlefield. The economic war is still pretty much a draw (Europe and Russia are losing).
BTW, according to Rosstat, Russia's inflation is significantly higher than Europe's.