Russian Peacekeeping Failure In Nagorno-Karabakh

Is Ukraine The Reason Why?

Last Tuesday, Azerbaijan, a small former Soviet republic in the Caucasus between the Black and Caspian Seas, launched what it termed an “anti-terrorist” operation within the ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerbaijan’s defense ministry said Tuesday it had begun an “anti-terrorist” campaign in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, as Armenian media and local authorities reported heavy bombardment of the regional capital of Stepanakert.

At least five people were killed, including a child, and 80 people were injured, amid artillery, missile and drone strikes by the Azerbaijan military, according to Armenian state news.

Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnic Armenian enclave that is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, has been the cause of two wars between the neighbors in the past three decades, most recently in 2020.

In little more than a day’s worth of fighting, Azerbaijani forces quickly overran the enclave, taking control of the territory that has been a point of contention between Azerbaijan and Armenia since the collapse of the former Soviet Union 30 years ago.

What gives this regional conflict wider significance is that, in the fighting, several Russian peacekeeping troops were apparently killed.

A car carrying Russian peacekeepers came under fire in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the servicemen in it were killed, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported.

Russian and Azerbaijani representatives of investigative authorities are working at the site of the death of Russian soldiers to clarify the circumstances.

While it would be unwise to read too much into these events, one question does automatically arise: Has Russian power in Central Asia been compromised by the ongoing war in Ukraine?

With so much focus being paid to the war in Ukraine, it is easy to overlook that Russia has a long border and is involved in regional issues along its length.

With the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan seemingly intractable and endless, Russia in 2020 began deploying troops in the region in a peacekeeping role, to keep the two sides from going to war yet again.

Russian peacekeepers, who deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh under the terms of the 2020 ceasefire, have been tasked with preventing a fresh conflict breaking out. But Moscow has been accused of being unable or unwilling to intervene to protect Armenia, its long-term ally, in the face of continuing aggression from Azerbaijan.

While Russia had successfully kept the peace in the Caucasus, earlier this year Armenia began having second thoughts about its relationship with Russia, and began accepting various overtures from the United States on security and other issues.

Nor has Armenia been shy about stating its reasoning for turning westward and away from Russia: Armenia believes Russia has failed in its peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh. In an interview with the Italian newspaper La Repubblica, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was blunt on the matter.

La Repubblica journalist Luca Steinmann – The viability of the Lachin Corridor should be guaranteed by Russian peacekeepers. We know that this is not happening, that Azerbaijan is de-facto controlling this corridor. We know how it happened, fake environmentalists and so on. But can you explain us the political process that brought Russia not to intervene to respect the agreement of November 9, 2020 that states that Russia should guarantee the movement through Lachin Corridor?

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan – I cannot make evaluation in this respect, except for agreeing with the formulation, that in fact, yes, it tuns out that the peacekeepers of the Russian Federation failed to implement the mission they have assumed under the tripartite statement and this is a matter of serious concern. Essentially, one of the main objectives of the presence of the Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno Karabakh was to ensure the security of the civilian population. In this case security involves the freedom of movement, and this right is not implemented, which is a matter of concern.

The Lachin Corridor is a roadway between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia proper by which the ethnic Armenians in the enclave are able to be supplied with food and other necessaries. On December 12 of last year, Azerbaijani activitists began blockading the Corridor presumably to protest Armenia’s illegal mining and exploitation of Azerbaijani natural resources within Nagorno-Karabakh.

Part of Russia’s peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh was to ensure the corridor stayed open. However, as became apparent earlier this spring, Russia’s success in keeping tensions in the region under control had slipped dramatically.

In May, a brief border clash erupted between Azerbaijan and Armenia, just as the leaders of both countries were due to meet with European Council President Charles Michel in Brussels for talks on settling their conflicts.

The incident comes just days before European Council President Charles Michel is to host Armenia’s Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev for talks in Brussels on Saturday.

The two also agreed to meet together with the leaders of France and Germany on the sidelines of a European summit in Moldova on June 1, according to the European Union.

The EU meeting came after US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken hosted the leaders in Washington, and reported “substantial progress” on their border security issues.

With Russia having negotiated the 2020 ceasefire arrangement, for this many western diplomats to be involved in settling this issue is remarkable.

Even more remarkable is the rather amazing coincidence that the Azerbaijani attacks occurred literally days after US troops arrived in Armenia for a “peacekeeping training exercise”.

Approximately 85 U.S. Soldiers will train alongside approximately 175 Armenian soldiers during Eagle Partner, a peacekeeping training exercise in Armenia, from Sept. 11-20.

The U.S. Soldiers from the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and Kansas National Guard, and the Soldiers from the Armenian 12th Peacekeeping Brigade will conduct the training at Zar and Armavir Training Areas near Yerevan.

With Russia having assumed primary peacekeeping responsibility for the region in the 2020 ceasefire, for US forces to be even practicing peacekeeping duties in Armenia is quite remarkable.

As the training area is near the Armenian capital of Yerevan, it is unlikely the US forces were ever in any danger from the Azerbaijani attacks. However, with two separate incidents involving fatalities among Russian peacekeepers during the Azerbaijani “anti-terrorist operation”, the US presence on Armenian soil does seem to highlight Russia’s seeming impotency with regards to this conlict.

Sputnik Armenia: two deputy commanders of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the region were killed as a result of shelling in Karabakh.

There is a particular irony in Russia voicing disapproval over the US-Armenian exercise even as Azerbaijani forces are responsible for Russian deaths in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The arrival of US soldiers for a peacekeeper training exercise in Armenia has rankled the Russian government, which has for decades acted as the sole security guarantor for the former Soviet republic. The 10-day “Eagle Partner” exercise, which began Monday, involves 85 US and 175 Armenian soldiers and aims to prepare the Armenians to take part in international peacekeeping missions.

The exercise, while small in scale, is the latest in a series of what Russia’s foreign ministry has deemed “unfriendly actions” taken by its traditional ally.

Yet the training exercise is merely the latest move by Armenia towards the west. Perhaps more significantly, Armenia’s Parliament seems likely to ratify the Rome Statute, acceding to the International Criminal Court—the same body which has issued an international arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin.

Armenia recently sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine for the first time, and its parliament is set to ratify the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute – meaning it would be obliged to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he were to set foot in the country, which Russia has long viewed as its own backyard.

Armenia’s flirtation with new international partners has been spurred by its frustration that Russia has been unable or unwilling to defend it against what it sees as aggression from neighboring Azerbaijan, and has raised questions about Russia’s ability to retain its hold on countries and conflicts across the former Soviet empire.

Indeed, Armenia’s westward turn is arguably far more than a flirtation, given Pashinyan’s statements to Italian media earlier this month.

Armenia’s security architecture 99,999% was linked to Russia, including in the logic of procurement of arms and ammunition, but today we see that Russia itself is in need of weapons, arms and ammunition and in this situation it’s understandable that even if it wishes so, the Russian Federation cannot meet Armenia’s security needs. This example should demonstrate to us that dependance of linkage in security matters from just one partner is just a strategic mistake. And after tasting the bitter fruits of this error post-factum, we are taking feeble attempts to diversify our security policy, including casting a different glance on own region, because it’s one thing when we in our region live under continuous confrontational logic with our neighbors, but say ok, someone will care for our security. But when in practice it comes to this someone to take care of our security, it turns out that this someone either does not want to or cannot ensure our security. These are realities which we have to confront with.

While the precise state of Russia’s military is inherently a matter of speculation, Pashinyan’s statements certainly add some credence to the perception that Russia’s military has taken a bit of a beating in Ukraine. We should bear in mind that, despite assessments in the West that Russia was massing troops in northern Ukraine for a fresh offensive, none has been forthcoming.

But Can They Fight?

How can Russia have lost half or more of its combat effectiveness, be unable to mount counteroffensive operations, and still be able to mass 100,000 troops plus 900 tanks along the northern part of the front?

A country which can amass 100,000 troops at a concentrated point surely has some combat capacity.

At the same time, if Russia has massed 100,000 troops near Kupyansk, why aren’t they attacking more vigorously? Why aren’t there larger territorial gains being made?

Pashinyan’s talk of “bitter fruits” makes Russia’s efforts to take a victory lap over the latest “cease-fire” in Nagorno-Karabakh (really a surrender by the Armenians in the enclave) seem a bit silly.

Endorsing yet another cease-fire in the conflict that embroils two of Moscow’s closest partners — Armenia and Azerbaijan — President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia “noted with satisfaction” on Wednesday that the Russian peacekeepers he sent to the region to enforce an earlier, failed truce had helped quell the renewed fighting.

Not mentioned in the Kremlin’s account of Mr. Putin’s telephone discussion with the leader of Armenia, however, was the fact that Russia’s peacekeepers had done nothing to keep the peace in the ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, as Mr. Putin had promised they would three years ago

Perhaps even sillier is the fact that RIA Novosti reports Russia’s contribution to the ceasefire as helping to disarm Karabakh’s militant forces.

The armed forces of Karabakh, under the control of Russian peacekeepers, began to hand over weapons, ammunition and armored vehicles, the Ministry of Defense reported .

“As of September 22, the following were delivered: six units of armored vehicles, more than 800 units of small arms and anti-tank weapons, about 5,000 ammunition,” the department’s newsletter says.

There are still 826 civilians in the custody of the Russian peacekeeping contingent, including 440 children, who now have no opportunity to return to their homes.

A peacekeeping force is supposed to prevent the sort of dislocating violence that leaves men, women, and children with no home and seeking refuge elsewhere. By that measure Russia’s efforts at peacekeeping have clearly failed.

Nor is it exactly a glowing endorsement of Russia’s peacekeeping abilities that Azerbaijan’s terms for the ceasefire were an outright surrender by forces within Nagorno-Karabakh.

Karabakh authorities said they have asked for immediate talks with Azerbaijan, amid continued shelling of the region.

In response, the Azerbaijani Presidency said it is willing to meet with Karabakh Armenians, but added in a statement: “To stop anti-terrorist measures, illegal Armenian armed groups must raise the white flag, surrender all weapons, and the illegal regime must dissolve itself. Otherwise, anti-terrorist measures will be continued until the end.”

The Azerbaijani defense ministry demanded in a statement Tuesday “the complete withdrawal of ethnic Armenian troops and the dissolution of the government in Stepanakert.”

“The only way to achieve peace and stability in the region is the unconditional and complete withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and the dissolution of the puppet regime,” it said.

RIA Novosti’s depiction of Russia’s involvement in the new ceasefire arrangement confirms reporting in western media that the pro-Armenian government in Karabakh has, in fact, surrendered and dissolved itself.

However, after pro-Armenian authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh agreed to lay down arms in the face of Azerbaijan's offensive, there are worries for the enclave's Armenian population.

Unable to withstand Azerbaijan's new offensive, the enclave's ethnic Armenian government has effectively surrendered, agreeing to fully disarm and disband its forces in return for a ceasefire. Both sides said talks will now be held on Thursday on issues around the "reintegration" of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan.

This being primarily an ethnic conflict between the Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples, Russia’s failure as a peacekeeper has the potential to lead to a fairly substantial humanitarian crisis in the Caucasus, as there are over 120,000 ethnic Armenians at risk of being displaced as Azerbaijan asserts control over Nagorno-Karabakh.

While Russian influence has been visibly waning in the Caucasus for most of the year, the speed with which Nagorno-Karabakh fell can only mean that Russian influence in the region has simply evaporated. Russian peacekeepers might still be in the region, but as they are assisting in disarming Karabakh’s armed forces they appear to be little more than functionaries assisting the Azerbaijani forces as they formalize their control over the region.

Russia certainly is not the power broker here, particularly as there do not appear to be any consequences accruing to Azerbaijan for the deaths of Russian peacekeepers (who almost certainly were killed by Azerbaijani shelling).

Intriguingly, neither is the US or the EU. The US-Armenian peacekeeping exercises were hardly a secret, and it is difficult to ascribe timing of the Azerbaijani attack as mere coincidence. While Azerbaijan is far from being any sort of global power, in the Caucasus they appear to have concluded they are the power in the region, and they are proceeding to exert hegemonic influence over the region.

At the moment, no one is telling Azerbaijan they cannot do that. Russia certainly is not telling Azerbaijan they cannot do that.

Yet on paper Russia has far more military assets than both Armenia and Azerbaijan combined. All things being equal, Russia should have more than enough military muscle to compel everyone in the Caucasus to play nice with each other.

Of course, all things are never equal, and the most obvious source of inequality for the Russian military is the war in Ukraine—a war Putin initiated in large measure to secure Russia’s south European flank.

A NATO Invasion Of Russia?

It would be the epitome of perverse irony if, as a result of Putin’s efforts to improve Russia’s security and influence in Europe, it has now lost all influence (and security) in the Caucasus. However, if Russia no longer has the miltary muscle to hold sway in the Caucasus, if it can no longer act as the regional hegemon there, the most probable reason for this sudden deficiency is the war in Ukraine.

Only time will tell what the true state of the Russian military is, but, at this moment, that perverse irony abounds.